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Abstract
The factors that contribute to a military officer's moral and ethical decisions in 
combat are investigated with a qualitative study o f interviews conducted with 
thirteen veterans. Theories o f moral reasoning are discussed from philosophical 
and psychological standpoints and are then applied to the interview format. Data 
are then analyzed for patterns and these patterns are linked with those drawn from 
military and psychological literature. Three patterns demonstrate an officer's 
need for control over his environment, the responsibility he feels towards his men. 
and how the officer must live with his decisions post hoc.
Moral Reasoning in Combat 
Introduction
Military ethics have become an essential, if not exceptional, ingredient in 
modem  warfare. While this has not always been the case, there has been much 
thought in the last two millennia to clarify and refine what is acceptable in time of 
war. When morals in war are discussed, examples such as My Lai commonly 
come to mind. Wliat about the more common moral decisions faced by combat 
leaders? My Lai was certainly not a typical example o f what line leaders face in 
day-to-day combat.
Before exploring that issue, it is important at this juncture to delineate 
between the morality o f  war itself (i.e. whether going to war is defensible or not) 
and the laws that govern the conduct o f  war. The popular stance is that the laws 
o f war are handed down by those who fight them, while the moral nature o f war 
itself is deliberated by academicians, theologians, and statesmen (Wakin. 1979).
W'Tiile the decision-making role o f the aviator or ship 's captain has been 
given due treatment in the literature (Orasanu & Backer. 1996). there is little to be 
said about the unique challenges waiting for the officer leading troops into ground 
combat. One o f the first writers on combat stress. General S.L..A.. Marshall, found 
that relatively few W orld War II soldiers fired their weapons due to the perception 
o f stress ( 1947). In the example o f My Lai, Company C was described as an 
"...edgy company, expecting a firefight and anxious to at last even the score for 
their comrades picked o ff by an invisible enemy” (Time, 1969). Hammer, in his 
book One Morning in the War (1970), notes that, by March 16, 1968. Charlie 
Company had been in the field nonstop for two and a half months. They had built
up a high level o f frustration due to the “invisible” nature o f  their enemy on 
whom they were unable to extract revenge for their fallen comrades.
W hat it is like, then, for the officer leading troops into combat has not 
been researched. In particular, the moral decisions that the officer must face -  
and the m anner in which those decisions are resolved -  is an area that warrants 
study. One possible avenue o f exploration might concern the influence the 
combat leader has in the moral nature o f his subordinates. The officer in charge 
o f combat troops often operates in isolation from higher-echelon units and may 
face complex moral issues in the field. How much guidance he is able to exert 
over his troops, however, is not fully understood.
Perhaps tlie search for common characteristics contributing to factors in 
moral reasoning might best be investigated through an analysis o f what 
constitutes moral reasoning, morality, or ethical thought. Towards this end. what 
follows is a discussion o f  forces that have influenced and defined Western morals 
in philosophical, psychological, and martial/international arenas, presented in a 
cltronological order o f  the research and scholarly literatures in each field.
Through this, the reader may gain an appreciation for the interaction o f influences 
that have led to the m odem  interpretations o f combat morality.
Literature Review 
It would be a difficult task to discuss moral reasoning in the Western 
culture w ithout discussing first some philosophical antecedents before moving 
into the psychological realm.
Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804)
In 1785, Immanuel Kant, by that time already a respected philosopher, 
finished writing his Foundations for the Metaphysics o f  Morals, which is regarded 
as one o f the m ost important works on morals ever uxitten (Moore & Bruder,
1990). In Foundations. Kant argues that an attempt to divine the moral right 
through emotional introspection is inefficient. He contended that reason is the 
only possible path to knowing what is right. Kant also drew a sharp line between 
reason and scientific investigation, saying that scientific investigation can only 
reveal how we are used to seeing things and relationships. The method o f 
scientific investigations is unable to bring new experiences into being (Paton. 
1936; Kant, 1785/1994a).
.4n exam ple would be to imagine a fire that bums yet remains cool to the 
touch (Moore & Bruder. 1990). This is difficult for most to imagine, as we have 
no basis o f experience to provide grounds for this concept. Scientific inquiry, at 
its best, could only show that such a fire has never existed before, not that it is 
inconceivable that it would ever exist. Experience provides a basis for our 
knowledge. However, once the mind understands its experiential base, it is no 
longer limited to experiential confines. While scientific inquiry can postulate that 
the First and Second Laws o f Thermodynamics have always held true, it cannot 
make the assertion that they always will (Paton, 1936).
Kant draws connections to the realm o f moral thought. In the 
Foundations. Kant explains that moral principles hold without exception. Tliis 
notion o f universality will be important later. The test, then, for deciding to 
engage in one course o f action over another is to determine if  this particular 
course o f  action is one that he or she would condone for everyone in every
situation. According to Kant, then, the supreme principle o f moralit) tells us 
that one is to act, "‘according to a maxim which can be adopted at the same time as 
a universal law” (Kant, 1785/1994a, p. 36, & Kant, 1785/1994b, p. 62). .As these 
moral principles are meant to be followed bv everyone and in every situation, 
then, they cannot be divined through scientific inquiry'.
Two more Kantian terms are the hypothetical imperative and the moral 
imperative. In the first, some desirable outcome is sought and a cause-effect 
relationship is established. For instance, if one wishes to live longer, then one 
must give up smoking. Note that this implies a choice between two values: 
longevity or pleasure. It is left for the individual to choose one over the other. 
This is qualitatively different from the moral imperative, which is universal, 
categorical, and unconditional. For Immanuel Kant, there is no choice implied in 
the moral imperative: it is obeyed for no other reason tlian its own rightness. 
There is no end sought in following a moral imperative (Kant. 1785/1994a).
To Kant. then, rationality is the source o f all value. He describes his 
supreme categorical imperative, that is. his notion o f a universal ideal that 
everyone could apply to every situation, as:
•‘So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that o f any 
other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only” (Kant. 1785/1994b. 
p. 76).
Kant provides the example o f  lying to another as using the other person merely as 
a means to some other end; for example, a man begs for money for his “sick
child,’' then spends the money he collects on liquor for himself. The one hearing 
the lie would never condone this mode o f  behavior and, therefore, the end is not 
contained in the person to whom the lie is made. With Kant, then, a rational 
understanding is made o f the Golden Rule o f the Christian faiths (as well as many 
others): “Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men do to you, do ye even 
so to them” (Matthew 7:12, KJV; see also Matthew 6:1-4, and Matthew 5:44-45).
Kant continued the argument that the effects (i.e. - consequences) o f  one's 
actions do not determine whether the act is good or irrational. The consequences 
are beyond one's ability to control. The moral worth o f a person's behavior lies 
in one's intentions. There is nothing o f this world that can be called ““good'' 
outside o f ‘“good will” (Moore & Bruder, 1990). This. too. will be important 
later.
To conclude. Kant believed a good, moral will is one upon which a person 
acts for no other reason than because it is the right thing to do. Helping others out 
o f  feelings o f sympathy or distress over their condition is o f  no moral worth. The 
moral worth is only that one's will is to help others because it is right to do so. 
even if  it means helping someone considered to be an enemy.
Moral Reasoning in Psychology
A .  Jean Piaget
The developmental psychologist Jean Piaget is used to bridge the two 
disciplines o f philosophy and psychology, as his work was largely influenced by 
philosophical - as opposed to psychological - antecedents. Two of the main
contentions o f Piaget’s theory o f child development are that a) children actively 
construct knowledge o f  their environment through manipulation and exploration 
and b) cognitive development occurs in stages. According to Piaget, a child 
becomes a moral being through repeated exposure to moral dilemmas appropriate 
to his or her age (Piaget. 1932/1965!. He came to identify two stages in the moral 
reasoning o f children: the heteronomous and autonomous moralities (Ibid.).
Heteronomous morality emerges at about the age o f five and lasts until 
about tlie child's tenth year. In this stage, rules governing games such as marbles 
are invariable and handed down from an authority that forbids questioning of the 
rules. This stage is characterized by notions o f egocentrism and an atmosphere 
which states that everyone who plays marbles always follows the rules. .Also 
present is the condition o f  realism, that the rules o f marbles are handed down by 
an objective, unapproachable, external force and cannot be altered (Flavell. 1963). 
The following scenarios may be considered:
"Story A: A little boy who is called John is in his room.
He is called to dinner. He goes into the dining room. But behind 
the door there was a chair, and on the chair there was a tray with 
fifteen cups on it. John couldn't have known that there was all this 
behind the door. He goes in, the door knocks against the tray, bang 
go the fifteen cups, and they all get broken!” (Piaget. 1932/1965. p.
1 2 2 ).
“Story B: Once there was a little boy whose name was 
Henry. One day when his mother w as out he tried to get some jam  
out o f the cupboard. He climbed up on to a chair and stretched out
his arm. But the jam  was too high up and he couldn't reach it and 
have any. But while he was trying to get it he knocked over a cup.
The cup fell down and broke.” (Ibid.).
It is no difficult matter to derive from these stories that the issue in 
question, as was the case with Kant, is one o f intentionality over consequences.
At the stage o f heteronomous morality, the child sees the first boy, John, as 
naughtier because more cups were broken.
This stage o f moral development concurs with Piaget’s notion o f the pre- 
operational and concrete operational stages o f cognitive development. The 
characteristics o f  these periods are that thinking moves toward logic, although it 
lacks the quality o f  abstraction. In 1963, Flavell characterized the pre-operational 
stage as being “unconcerned with proof or logical justification and. ..unaware o f 
the effect o f its communication on others” (p. 162). The second stage, concrete 
operational, evidences a greater degree o f logical and flexible thought, although 
the child has not yet mastered the ability to think in the abstract. This idea of 
abstract thought is an important notion to grasp. The growing adolescent is 
becoming able to see all possible angles to a situation, even if such an angle is not 
one that is presented, as Kant argued, that experience provides a basis for 
knowledge, which is then free to slip the bonds the experience imposes.
As the adolescent reaches concrete operational thought, autonomous 
morality allows intentionality to become a stronger factor than consequences in 
settling moral issues. Henrv'. then, though he only knocked over one cup. is seen 
as being naughtier than John, as Henry had set out with the intention o f  stealing 
some jam. Through discussions with others and a realization that other
perspectives are possible, children come to settle conflicts in ways that are 
mutually beneficial and a standard o f  impartial fairness emerges. This reciprocity 
is manifested in children who express the same concern for others that they do for 
themselves, which is similar to Mill's notion o f the impartial arbiter o f issues who 
is not given to preferential treatment. Also at the autonomous stage, rules o f play 
are adapted to fit special circumstances (Ibid.).
Another change from the heteronomous to the autonomous stages involves 
the notion o f  immanent justice. The first, heteronomous. stage holds that if one 
commits a bad or immoral act. then one will ultimately be made to suffer for it.
As such, it would be entirely conceivable that the naughtier Henry-of-the-one-cup 
would fall o ff his bicycle and hiui him self as retribution for his behavior. This 
idea o f immanent justice is the way that the natural world instills moral order 
through inescapable punishment. Other examples would be knives that cut 
children who have been forbidden to use them or the chair that collapses under 
Henr\ when he tries to steal jam.
This notion speaks to a child's paradigm of egocentrism and magic 
omnipotence, where nature obeys a specific code. It would seem very plausible to 
a child that the moon should follow them when they walk at night or that it is the 
act o f going to bed that produces darkness. This entelechal notion extends easily 
to the point tliat children see things as the accomplices o f grown-ups in making 
sure that punishment is served where the parents' vigilance has been evaded 
(Piaget, 256).
In the second, autonomous, stage, immanent justice is discarded and 
replaced with the idea that the punishment should be made to fit the crime and
meted out in a fair and even-handed fashion. This would be seen in the stealer 
who is trusted by no one.
Tlirough investigation and exploration into moral issues, the child comes 
to realize a notion o f reciprocity and fairness that can be adapted to fit a changing 
circumstance. This child, by eleven years or so, gives younger children who are 
just leaming a game an extra try or may even overlook some errors. This is 
evidence that the child has moved outside o f his or her own egocentrism and has 
started seeing the perspective o f others. In this instance, egocentrism implies that 
the child sees his own needs and what is right for him self is what is right for 
everyone. For instance, the child whose mother is sick may offer her his teddy 
bear to comfort her. Also, the child experiences some evil that goes unpunished 
and some good acts that go unnoticed. Adult authority, then, can no longer create 
a true sense o f  justice in children. .As the adult is in a position o f power and 
control, there can be no homeostasis in the child's moral development. The child 
begins to work out moral problems on his own and with his peers. .As he 
approaches adolescence, he comes to see him self as the adults' equal, even if this 
is not overtly expressed (Piaget, 1965; Pulaski. 1971).
Combined with the idea o f impartial concern for others, a "Golden Rule" 
notion emerges that can be applied across person and situation as discussed in 
Kant's supreme categorical imperative (Pulaski. 1971).
Piaget leads one to understand that stage progression can only occur 
through the child's deliberation o f the task and mental manipulation o f  the 
different factors that weigh into the problem. Children may progress to formal 
operations in some areas, yet remain concrete in others (horizontal decolage) if
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there is limited exposure for such a task. One might accurately predict that a child 
who frequently plays with blocks and dough will progress more rapidly to such 
tasks as conservation o f mass and visual-spatial tasks on intelligence tests. Such 
reasoning extends to the moral domain as well. Encouraging children to think for 
themselves would foster greater development in the moral domain than would any 
constraining attempts to create a moral identity foreclosure. .\n  example would 
be the child who progresses to an adult-level conclusion without first working 
through the issues involved. The result would be more o f  a tape-recording o f 
what the adult said than an intrinsic conclusion o f the child 's (Getz. 1984).
B. LauTence Kohlberg
Expanding on Piaget's work. Kohlberg developed the six stages of moral 
reasoning with which one is familiar today:
Level One - Pre-conventional Moral thought is dominated by
external forces rather than by a standard code. Thinking falls more along fearful
and dependent or opportunistic lines than internal autonomy.
Stage 1 - Obedience and punishment - Deference is made to a 
superior power. This orientation seeks to avoid getting in trouble.
Stage 2 - Instrumentalist - Egoistic orientation believes that right action is that 
which satisfies the person's own needs, which also means occasionally satisfying
the needs o f others. Exchange and reciprocity are key, with the actor becoming 
aware o f the relative nature o f  each person's needs and perspectives.
Level Two - Conventional Doing what others expect and maintaining 
conventional social orders and norms are important, as is staying in keeping with 
"good" and "right" roles.
Stage 3 - "Good boy, nice girl" - The actor seeks approval from others and has a 
desire to please and help them. Judgements take intentionality into account and 
the actor strives to conform to a stereotypical norm or role o f behavior.
Stage 4 - "Law and order" - One seeks to do one's duty and to show respect for 
authority. The social order is respected for its own sake, as seen in Hobbes' view 
o f "my country, right or wrong."
Level Three - Post-conventional The moral benchmark lies in a sharable 
standard, right, or duty. The individual seeks to conform to this standard.
Stage 5 - Social contract - Duty is perceived as a product of social contract. 
Violations o f  the rights and wills o f others is generally avoided, and value is 
placed on the majority's will and welfare. Locke's utilitariansim offers “the 
greatest good for the greatest number.”
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Stage 6 - Universal ethical principle - Conscience directs one's actions, and the 
orientation is to logical universality and applicability o f  a consistent moral 
framework. A high value is placed on mutual respect and trust.
(Kohlberg, 1967, p. 171)
.At the highest stages o f  thought in the Kohlberg model, the familiar 
Kantian notion o f universality is applied to all situations by all people. K ant's 
moral test still holds fast, that the determination o f whether to engage in an action 
is whether one would prescribe the same action to all people in all situations. In 
these stages, Piaget's postulates o f heteronomy translate to the first three o f the 
stages, and heteronomy carries from stage four into stage six.
Wlien Kohlberg conducted his investigations into the moral nature o f 
humanity, he typically posed his dilemmas and then recorded the participant's 
responses, which were then graded by trained judges who attempted to reach 
some consensus on tlie level o f moral thought that the participant displayed for a 
given response (Kohlberg et al.. 1978 ). Note that this method has been criticized 
as a weakness in his research, as there could be room for subjectivity in the 
grading o f the responses. Kohlberg addressed this concern with extensive training 
going into each o f the graders and a high degree o f inter-rater reliability.
However, the face validity o f the statements in question versus the comments o f 
the graders leaves room to doubt whether the grading could ever be truly 
objective (Kohlberg, 1983).
In addition, some responses that Kohlberg collected did not fit into any 
category that his rationalistic. Western thought had developed. The Heinz
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dilemma drew a sour face from one village chief in New Guinea, who replied that, 
for Heinz to find him self in such a difficult position, the whole village must 
accept responsibility for not having come to his aid sooner. In India, amidst gross 
over-crowding, disease, famine, and death, a woman responded that it really made 
no difference one way or the other. Property is stolen. A  woman dies. Such 
things were so commonplace in her schemata that one more such incident would 
hardly warrant turning one's head, let alone allowing for unnecessary cogitation 
over the matter. She concluded that such matters could not be worked out on an 
individual basis and would probably have to be tackled at a macro level (Vasudev 
& Hummel, 1987; Kohlberg, 1984).
.Another criticism o f Kohl berg 's work concerns the link between moral 
thought and moral action, an argument even Lawrence Kohlberg saw fit to make 
in 1973. It would certainly seem plausible that, in a face-to-face interview, the 
respondent would make some effort, even at an unconscious level, to distort his 
true moral manner. There are also many incidents where a person felt certain that 
he would behave one way and. when faced with a moral challenge in real life, did 
exactly the opposite. This researcher talked with a Viemani veteran who smiled 
to himself when new recruits protested being in Viemam, due to their 
conscientious objections to war. They professed that there was no way they could 
ever be made to kill another human being. However, it never failed that, as soon 
as the first enemy bullet whizzed overhead, the “conscientious objector” would be 
on the ground and shooting back as quickly as he could (Thoma, Rest. & Davison,
1991).
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Snell's 1996 research suggests a mediated connection between Kohlberg’s 
model and the decisions that take place in the real world, where people might not 
have a full appreciation for the factors in a decision when looking at an analog 
study. In real life, however, that person might be confronted in a more real sense 
by such pressures as anticipated rewards and punishments or personality 
variables, for instance. Trevino's 1992 study supported the notion that, in analog 
moral research, people reason out their arguments at whatever moral stage is 
highest for them. For instance, if a person is a stage four thinker, it would be 
plausible to assume that the person could reason at any o f the lower stages as 
well, perhaps being influenced by instrumental morality or even punishment and 
reward. What Trevino found, however, was that the highest stage that the person 
has attained is the one used to weigh a moral dilemma.
Consequential ethics cannot be ignored in moral research. It has been 
demonstrated that corporate managers reason in a more utilitarian fashion. 
Furthermore, the perceived consequences are critical in examining the sequence 
of their reasoning style (Weber. 1996).
In one classic study that looked at the link between moral thought and 
moral action, seminar)' students showed up at a certain time in one building and 
were then told they had to give a talk on the parable o f the Good Samaritan in 
another building. On the walkway between the two buildings, a confederate o f 
the researchers lay groaning as the student walked past, supposedly looking very- 
much like the victim o f  the story. In 60 percent o f the cases, the participants did 
not offer help to the ‘‘victim .” In some instances, the participants actually stepped 
over this “wounded m an” as they hurried to the next building to give their speech
15
(Darley & Batson, 1973). This would imply that the correlation between one’s 
moral convictions and one’s actions is not always strong.
Perhaps one o f the mechanisms that did not fire in the sequence of the 
students who passed by the “victim ” was in recognizing that someone needed aid. 
Surely, in the de-briefing, those students were smacking their foreheads in dismay 
over their actions.
Criticisms aside, however, Kohlberg's work represents a breaking advance 
in the field o f moral thought and his model has gained wide acceptance. .>\nother 
aspect o f the stage theor>' is how people move between the stages and what 
transitional mechanisms must take place. In a longitudinal study o f 227 school 
children in British Columbia, W alker and Taylor (1991) concluded that most 
people reason predominantly at a single stage. However, they are also careful to 
point out that there is some reasoning that takes place in adjacent stages. If  a 
person is reasoning predominantly above the mode, one might conclude that 
person is in a transition phase and is progressing to a higher stage. If above-mode 
reasoning is present (i.e.. a positive bias), this seems to be the necessary and 
sufficient requirement for modal advance (Berkowitz & Keller. 1994 ). True to 
Piagetian theory, disequilibrium lies at the seat o f the motivation for transition 
(Feldman. 1980; Thoma & Rest. 1999).
James Rest (1984) has postulated a sequence o f  moral thought that helps 
to fill in the gaps about why some moral dilemmas are never recognized as such. 
In his work. Rest outlines four non-invariant and non-sequential steps that 
ordinarily occur in the process o f  moral thinking.
16
In the first step, a situation is seen in a moral light. In Rest’s words, the 
individual must “ interpret the situation in terms o f how one’s actions affect the 
welfare o f  others” (Rest. 1984. p. 57). This involves a “chess” cognition, 
whereby the individual imagines the possible courses o f action and how each 
possible move would affect the welfare o f the parties involved.
This can be affected by several factors from social psychological research. 
For instance, if  the observer is not clear that there is a victim in distress, he will be 
less likely to help (Staub. 1978). .A.lso. a plethora o f factors relating to how- 
connected we feel to the victim will influence how quickly we perceive that a 
moral dilemma is taking place in front o f  us.
In the second component, the person evaluates what the ideal moral action 
would be. By this time, the person has developed a range of possible responses to 
the situation and now bends to the task o f deciding which is the one course that 
best meets his own moral schemata. This is also the stage where the 
aforementioned theories o f  Piaget and Kohlberg intercede. When faced with a 
morally novel situation, the person calls on his memory o f  moral resolutions and 
the issues pertinent to the situation (Ibid.).
Interestingly, there seems to be a correlation between the amount o f 
education one has and one's level o f moral reasoning. .According to Rest's 
research, adults in the 50-60 year old range who completed high school but did 
not attend college have about the same scores on an instrument o f moral 
reasoning as current high school students. Also, adults in the 50-60 year range 
who ^  complete college have about the same moral score as their younger, 
college-attending counterparts (Rest, 1979). This research seems reflective o f
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Piaget's original developmental notion that the more a person struggles with a 
developmental task, the higher that person will progress. .Another finding that is 
germane to the helping professions is that the moral development scores o f 
medical interns was significantly linked to the quality o f care they provided. This 
is particularly significant in light o f the fact that there are few good predictive 
indicators o f the future performance o f medical students. A possible 
interpretation o f  this finding is that being able to help others is linked significantly 
to one’s level o f  moral judgement (Sheehan, Husted. & Candee. 1981. as quoted 
in Rest. 1984). How these figures play out in military populations, however, is 
not known.
In the third component, a person decides whether or not to fulfill the moral 
ideal. This is influenced by a constellation o f  competing values. In many 
instances, there is a marked difference between what one ought to do and what 
one actually does (Blasi. 1980; Kunines & Gewitz. 1984; Milgram. 1974). In 
1977. Damon contributed to the ideas o f distributive Justice by asking children 
how an odd number o f candy bars ought to be distributed among their peers.
Their ideas about how they ought to be distributed were generally more noble and 
lofty than what occurred in reality. Not surprisingly, when the children were 
asked to fairly distribute paper clips among their peers, the moral thoughts were 
consistent with the moral actions!
W ith so many competing values at stake in making a moral decision, why. 
then, would the moral alternative win out? The motivations to act morally are 
influenced by a host o f factors which have, in turn, been supported by a bevy of 
research. Wilson (1975) proposed the ethological notion that we behave morally
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because evolution has bred moral, altruistic behavior into us in order to advance 
the species (also Eysenck, 1976). Aronfreed (1968) exhumed St. .Augustine's 
notion that shame, guilt, and fear o f  God motivate us to “act right.” Bandura 
offered that being moral was not a factor o f motivation per se: rather, it was 
simply a matter o f learning social behavior and “monkey see - monkey do” 
(1977). However, this argument has never made it to postconventional moral 
thought.
Elliot Turiel was one researcher who distinguished between morality and 
social convention. In his 1980 work, Turiel stated that customs are actions that 
are performed with some regularity but do not serve a social-organizational 
function. For many, it is customary- to eat breakfast every morning. However, 
there is no obligation to do so, and the custom is readily alterable due to its 
arbitrary nature. However, within the moral domain, “actions are not arbitrary, 
and the existence o f  a social regulation is not necessary for an individual to view 
an event as a transgression” (p. 258). In the example o f  hitting someone else, it is 
the features that are intrinsic to the event that constitute the transgression (i.e. - 
the consequences to the victim), not the social context in which the event took 
place.
The distinction, then, implies that a notion o f justice is included in the 
ethical argument. The assaultive person was doing someone an injustice by 
hitting his victim. However, it would not be seen as unjust if  the businessman 
opted not to take his breakfast before heading o ff to work.
The final component o f  Rest’s theoiy is the implementation and execution 
o f the moral plan (Rest, 1984). Character seems to be a major factor in this stage.
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and the ambiguous nature o f  this idea was plumbed by Hartshome and May in 
their landmark three-volume work (1929). In their view, a degree o f consistency 
exists whereby similar traits and characteristics maintain stable patterns across 
time and situations. Simply having the valued ideals o f firm resolve, persistence, 
and ego-strength are not enough. One could reasonably argue that the 16th 
century conquistador Cortez had a forfeit o f all o f these when he conquered the 
.\ztec empire.
Self-control, then, is an important factor. In 1974, Mischel conducted an 
experiment that demonstrated the efficacy o f cognitive components in self-control 
for children. In the control group (granted they were not aptly named), children 
were seated before a marshmallow and were instructed to think o f  all its 
wonderful qualities, such as its soft. chew\' sweetness. The experimental group 
focused on more neutral qualities, thinking o f the marshmallow instead as a 
‘■puffy, while cloud" or as a cotton ball. The children who thought o f the more 
gustatory qualities consistently waited for a shorter time before gobbling up the 
tasty treats.
Many factors, then, lead a person toward or away from a moral course of 
action. To summarize Rest's theory, then, the four components in the process of 
moral thinking are:
Component 1 - Interpret the situation as a moral dilemma, 
recognizing how one's actions affects the welfare o f  others.
Component II - Identify what the morally ideal course o f 
action would be.
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Component III - Select and retain the moral ideal from 
competing values or desires.
Component IV - Implementation and execution o f the 
moral plan (Rest. 1984).
This should give the reader a fairly thorough account o f the work 
that has been done in the field o f individual moral development. Whether 
the individual's cognitions may be studied in isolation of the influences of 
others, however, remains a matter o f debate. Group decision-making has 
also been a subject o f interest in the recent literature. Dukerich et al. 
studied the leader's role in group morality. Their findings indicate that the 
degree o f principled reasoning demonstrated by the group leader was a 
key factor in the moral reasoning and growth o f individual group 
members. This shows that the group leader has a significant impact not 
only on how the individual members conceptualize moral issues, but also 
on which issues members conceptualize as moral.
Perhaps the most difficult moral decisions involve those that center on 
taking a human life. In a study o f capital jurors by Haney. Sontag, & Costanzo 
(1994). it seems clear from their research that, in a situation with such gravity 
inherent in its outcome, the decision-makers appreciate more structure as opposed 
to less and some acknowledgment o f the emotional aspects of the task they are 
asked to perform.
Personal values, then, are key in the process o f  moral reasoning. James 
W eber (1993) expanded on the work o f both Lawrence Kohlberg and that o f 
Milton Rokeach (1973) to integrate the principle stages o f moral reasoning with a
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four-factor model o f personal values, to include terminal values (personal and 
social) and instrumental values (competence and moral). Rokeach uses the term 
“terminal values” to mean the moral light in which a person is viewed, which 
helps to detennine how much attention is given to a particular moral decision. 
Instrumental values are the ways in which a person wrestles with moral dilemmas, 
drawing perhaps on past moral decisions or efficiency o f reasoning. .A.nalysis o f 
the results showed significant relationships between the two theories, suggesting 
that personal values do play an important factor in moral decision-making.
•Another researcher integrating personality and moral judgm ent is 
.Avaraham Leslau. whose 1994 research showed a relationship between 
psychoticism (impulsivity. hostility, and aggressiveness) and moral Judgement, 
whereb) a person who rates high on a measure o f psychoticism is unlikely to 
carry empathy or humaneness into a moral situation.
The moral reasoning o f  managers has been studied to show that managers 
typically reason at stage three or four o f Kohlberg's stages (Weber, 1990). 
Differences were found, however, when manipulating the complexity o f the moral 
issue and when studying the size o f the organization in which the manager was 
employed. In W eber's study, it was found that dilemmas that were couched in a 
business theme (e.g. - loan fraud) were decided using a lower level o f  reasoning 
than those in which the decision involved an individual life. Also, those self- 
employed or small business managers reasoned at a higher level than tlieir 
corporate counterparts.
A 1993 study by Ruth Linn examined one particular case o f  moral 
reasoning where an officer was given a morally reprehensible order to break the
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bones o f  villagers suspected o f inciting riots in the 1988 Intifada in Israel. Ben 
M oshe's testimony reveals considerable inner conflict with these orders, 
particularly after rounding up unprotesting villagers and carrying out his orders. 
Though he was never an agent (i.e., he never beat any o f the villagers himself), he 
recognized his decision as having a greater impact on the villagers than those 
decisions o f  the individual soldiers who carried out his orders. Linn’s research 
suggests that resistance to authority may be motivated by a care orientation and 
that a morality o f justice is difficult, if not impossible, to separate from a morality 
o f care such as Carol Gilligan described in her 1982 work. Gilligan (1982) had 
found that women typically were portrayed as reasoning on a moral level 
significantly lower than that o f men based on Kohlberg's grading system. She 
contended that Kohlberg’s theory was based on a justice-seeking mentality that 
did not fit the moral structure of women, which is based on care.
The context in which moral behavior occurs was a matter o f a second 
(1994) study by Linn, in which she describes how 36 conscientious objectors in 
the 1982 War in Lebanon were branded as "leftists, delinquents, and lawbreakers 
who were undermining democracy” (Ibid.. pg. 424). This clearly shows that their 
actions were viewed in political, rather than moral terms. The individual, 
however, is still the one responsible for actions undertaken in war and not for the 
righteousness o f the w ar’s objectives. Though the moral arguments o f the 
objectors were articulate, it was questioned whether or not they were sincere. 
.Apparently, this is not the only instance where the individual soldiers decided that 
the qualifications for a ju st war had been crossed. Even with the rigid control and
discipline placed on military troops, independent though is difficult or even 
impossible to completely efface.
An individual’s prior actions are also taken into account when judgments 
are made about his or her decisions. In a study of individual recent moral history, 
Nisan and Horenczyk (1990) found that a single, unworthy act generated less guilt 
and was more allowable in a generally moral person than in one who generally 
behaves in an immoral fashion. .Actions, then, are not performed in a vacuum and 
the morality o f an act is evaluated not only in terms of its inherent moral 
adequacy, "but also by evaluation o f the moral status o f the actor about to perform 
it” (Ibid.. 41). It suggests that analogous research (e.g.. the Heinz dilemma) fails 
to take this factor into account.
Decision-making
Central to the study o f combat morality is the study o f decision-making as 
a separate field o f  research apart from moral reasoning. Prominent in this area. 
Janis and Mann (1977) posited that the only sound and rational path to effective 
decision-making is through a painstaking search for relevant information, 
unbiased assimilation o f  that information, and appraisal o f alternatives.
Keinan. Friedland. and Ben-Porath (1987) discussed how decision-makers 
scan for alternatives. Where vigilance might be the most sound process to 
decision, hypervigilance may show "hasty, disorganized and incomplete 
evaluation of information, leading to faulty decisions and post-decisional regret” 
(Ibid., p. 220).
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Johnston, Driskell, and Salas also noted that the hypendgilant pattern o f 
decisions could occasionally save time and effort, making it an effective course o f 
action in a naturalistic task setting (1997). Janis and Mann (1977), however, 
would contend that the decision rendered in hypervigilance is one that is defective 
and comes from a poor coping strategy.
The naturalistic style o f decision-making is reported by Orasanu and 
Connolly (1993). If the decision task is unclear (e.g., the patrol is sent out with 
the ill-defined goal o f "patrolling”), the available information may have led to 
uncertainty due to missing, unreliable data or changing conditions. Enemy may 
or may not have been present and the reports on enemy activity that intelligence 
gave were always suspect. Other items identified in the model include time 
stress, high stakes, and multiple players. Organizational goals and norms factor 
importantly here, as they do in every facet o f militaiy life. A s  such, it would be 
unfeasible to isolate decision-making from the task in which the decision is made 
(Klein. 1996; Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998; Endsley & Smith. 1996).
How information is analyzed in a real-life situation also bears a good deal 
o f  weight on what decision is made. A  study by Endsley & Smith in Texas 
( 1996) suggested that, when faced with multiple targets on their radar scope, 
fighter pilots "chunk” a good deal o f their information to allow for greater 
efficiency o f information processing. This may be o f  particular importance for 
the pilot faced with a bewildering array o f  electronics and instrumentation and 
having to make extremely fast decisions that can have such lasting impact.
Another distinction o f note is the difference between uncontrollable and 
controllable stress as it impacts decision-making. In a 1994 study by Peters, it
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was shown that uncontrollable stress has a greater negative impact on mood (these 
participants had increased anger while the control group remained relatively 
stable) and the decision making process. In the study, those facing uncontrollable 
stress were less systematic and accurate than those in the control group, regardless 
o f the type o f  stress the participants faced. In this study, a person moves from a 
period of zero control to an attempt to gain control over his surroundings.
The notion o f  time as a factor in decision making is discussed by Maule 
and Hockey (1993) to differentiate between time as a deadline to mediate 
changing affective states as they influence cognition and to assume that time is 
only one o f a number o f factors included in a cost/benefit evaluation o f strategy.
Studies o f  animal combat have rendered two possible conclusions. The 
first is that, given the threat o f retaliation, animals only fight to injure if less 
aggressive measures have failed and then only if the potential benefit is expected 
to outweigh the cost. The second possibility is that any animal attack will 
escalate unless the attack is thwarted by the defender (Pellis. 1997). Such combat 
involves moment-to-moment decision making, as opposed to one conviction that 
is carried through the sequence o f events. In humans, however, such a study 
discounts the idea o f  the “preemptive strike” that is supported b \’ a majority of 
retired officers in a 1990 study by Brunk, Secrest. and Tamashiro. They further 
concluded that the view held by scholars o f war is either not salient or 
inconsistent with the view o f the military officer.
Perhaps studies o f emergency response strategies would be appropriate in 
shedding light on the cognitive strategies used by combat officers. Kontogiannis
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( 1996) identified several characteristics that are worthy o f note in emergency- 
tempo decision-making:
“The m ain factors that are likely to influence human 
decision making in managing an emergency can be summarized as 
follows:
The consequences o f  failing to manage an emergenc}' are 
highly stressful and potentially life threatening.
There is time pressure in accomplishing tasks in order to 
avoid escalation o f  the emergency.
Existing operating procedures offer little guidance in 
dealing with many unfamiliar aspects o f the emergency.
Operators have to perform tasks for which they have 
received little or no prior training.
Information available about technical conditions m a\ be 
ambiguous and unreliable.
The workload is ver>' high as operators may have to 
manage multiple tasks and work for prolonged hours, and finally.
Decision making is affected by conflicting goals, 
uncertainty about outcomes, and negative feedback o f results (p.
76)."
In 1996, Klein delineated the aspects o f the Recognition-Primed Decision, 
where rapid decisions are made based on experience and a typical course of 
action, similar to the clinician 's model where diagnosis leads to treatment 
protocols. “Over-learning" has been shown to be the primary method through
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which training becomes robust to the effects o f stress. The following vignette is 
taken from John M aster's The Road Past Mandalay, as quoted in Grossman's 
1995 work On Killing: The Psychological Cost o f  Learning to Kill in War and 
Society:
“The No. 1 [gunner] was 17 years old - 1 knew him. His 
No. 2 [assistant gunner] lay on the left side, beside him. head 
toward the enemy, a loaded magazine in his hand ready to whip 
onto the gun the moment the No. 1 said “Change!'’ The No. 1 
started firing, and a Japanese machine gun engaged them at close 
range. The No. 1 got the first burst through the face and neck, 
which killed him instantly. But he did not die where he lay. behind 
the gun. He rolled over to the right, away from the gun. his left 
hand coming up in death to tap his No. 2 on the shoulder in the 
signal that means Take over. The No. 2 did not have to push the 
corpse away from the gun. It was already clear” (pg. 18).
Though it seems common knowledge in the military that constant drilling 
in martial skills leads to better performance on the battlefield, this notion has 
received little attention from the literature. It has been demonstrated that well- 
leamed or over-learned tasks become automatic, which has the benefit of being 
robust to stress, requires less attention, and enhances the soldier's feeling of 
predictability and control (Driskell & Salas, 1991). Through this over-learning, it 
is hoped that the soldier develops an experience base from which to draw at the 
crucial point o f the Recognition-Primed Decision model (Klein. 1996).
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Overall, the existing literature on this subject is lacking. Many attempts 
were made to uncover what research is out there, but the brunt o f military 
research focuses either on fighter pilots or submarine captains. O f those, the 
majority seem to focus on decision-making styles, usually in hopes o f getting 
these officers to think more r a p id l y .  There were, however, a number of research 
articles that dealt with the moral view officers hold o f war as an idea. Research 
involving ground officers leading troops into combat, however, were extremely 
limited.
Statement o f Problem 
The area that historically has posed what are. arguably, the toughest moral 
decisions in the world is the field o f combat. The extreme nature o f the intensity 
encountered in combat requires those who participate to face decisions involving 
life and death with a high price for failure. The officers who lead troops into 
battle are given the responsibility to determine not only the lives and deaths o f the 
enemy, but also o f their own men as they direct their subordinates to undertake 
dangerous and sometimes lethal missions. This is aside and apart from the 
notions o f the morality o f  war itself, the ius ad hello. This deals perhaps less with 
an academic/philosophical and more with an applied nature o f morality, o f ius in 
bello. where those weighing the decisions bear immediate and horrible witness to 
the cost o f their moral Judgements.
The proposed study will seek to investigate the moral reasoning of 
military officers who led troops into combat. It is hoped that, through this 
research, the following questions may be clarified:
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1) What is it like to be a leader o f  military troops rendering moral decisions in 
combat?
2) WTiat are the ethical points with which the officers struggle upon encountering 
morally complex issues?
3) If an officer acts in either an ethical or unethical manner, can James Rest's 
framework be identified as playing significant parts?
4) Regardless o f  the decisions made while in combat, does the combat veteran 
demonstrate development in moral reasoning? In other words, looking back on 
the decisions rendered in combat, does the veteran show that he struggled with the 
issues and. perhaps, developed an alternate course o f action that was more 
consistent with his moral nature?
5) What training in ethics do the officers receive prior to being placed in combat 
and does tltis training influence their decisions when under fire?
6) Are there identifiable differences in the moral reasoning and associated 
thought processes between the officers who have been in combat and the officers 
who have never seen combat?
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Method
Evaluating the questions that the author wished to clarify through this 
research resulted in a determination that quantitative research would fall short o f 
the desired illumination. Tlie nature o f  these questions is abstract and open- 
ended. A  pilot study showed that few combat veterans were hound by the 
multiple choice nature o f Rest’s Defining Issues Test (DIT, Rest, 1984) when 
presented with questions in a verbal format. One veteran was able to explain that 
the decisions faced in combat were unamenable to "multiple-choice thinking" and 
that there was almost never a clear-cut course o f action in dealing with issues o f 
moral impact. The veterans who participated in the pilot study also had enough 
variability o f experiences both in combat and in the development o f their moral 
schemata that the richness o f their phenomological experiences could have been 
restrained in the use o f quantitative research.
lire  qualitative form of inquiry, then, was selected as being more 
conducive to the conduct o f this research. The characteristics o f the qualitative 
study are described by Hammersley in his 1990 work entitled Readimi 
Ethnographic Research:
a) People's behavior is studied in everyday contexts, rather than under 
experimental conditions by the researcher.
b) Data are gathered from a range o f sources, but observ ation and/or 
relatively informal conversations are usually the main ones.
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c) The approach to data collection is ‘unstructured’ in the sense that it 
does not involve following through a detailed plan set up at the beginning; nor are 
the categories used for interpreting what people say and do pre-given or fixed. 
This does not mean that the research is unsystematic; simply that initially the data 
are collected in as raw a form, and on as wide a front, as feasible.
d) The focus is usually a single setting or group, o f relatively small scale. 
In life history research the focus may even be on a single individual.
e) The analysis o f the data involves interpretation o f the meanings and 
functions o f human actions and mainly take the form of verbal descriptions and 
explanations, with quantifications and statistical analysis playing a subordinate 
role at most (p. 1-2).
Perhaps the most compelling reason for this author to employ the 
qualitative inquiry is the author's clinical background as a therapist. The 
information-gathering nature o f the data collection lends itself ver>- neatly to the 
author's experience interviewing clients seeking treatment, as well as the author's 
more humanist leanings that focus on the ricliness and diversity o f each individual 
in his world, which is best learned through an interpersonal connection between 
the interviewer and the interviewee.
Having established justification for the use o f qualitative research, some 
effort will be made to address the criterion for selection o f participants. The
requirements entailed that the majority o f participants be officers who led troops 
in ground combat. This implies three core points:
First, the participants interviewed in the pilot study confirmed that there 
was a difference between being in combat and serving in the rear echelons, as the 
combat soldier places him self at risk and is also expected to take the lives o f the 
enemy. In addition to these challenging circumstances, the officer is responsible 
for ordering others to risk their lives or take the lives o f others.
The second point, that the participant had led troops, is important for the 
aforementioned reason and to distinguish those who served as staff officers (e.g. - 
an officer who handled supply matters or communications) from those who 
commanded troops (e.g. - the platoon leaders and company commanders).
Lastly, the arena o f ground combat provides some loose homogeneity of 
experiences as compared with the pilot o f a fighter aircraft or the captain o f a 
submarine. In addition, while the hardships endured by the participants o f all 
three o f these combat settings were certainly very high, the moral complexities 
faced by those troops engaged in ground combat seem somewhat higher, as the 
soldier on the ground is more likely to see the result of his actions (e.g. - the 
expressions on the faces o f  the soldiers he ordered to fight who were then killed). 
Morally, this factor o f  seeing the results o f one 's  action seems to generate a 
greater degree o f doubt and uncertainty than tliose who are somewhat more 
removed from the impact o f  their actions, such as the pilot o f  a bomber who drops 
his bomb load from 20.000 feet at near-supersonic speeds. There seems to be a 
connection that the soldier in ground combat forms not only with his subordinates 
but also with the enemy. The pilot study interviews served to show that many of
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the veterans felt var}'ing degrees o f  respect for the fighting prowess o f  the enemy 
they faced, if  not a respect for the personal lives o f those they killed (e.g. - a 
concern for the wives and children the fallen enemy soldier left behind).
While most o f the participants were veterans o f  combat command, not all 
o f them were. Three were officers at an officer training program where soldiers 
are sent to receive training to become officers and, upon satisfactory completion 
o f the training, are given a commission as Army officers. They were included to 
provide further illumination (through negative contrast) o f  the manner in which 
combat experience may influence one's moral framework. Two other participants 
were combat veterans, but were chaplains at the time and thus did not command 
troops. They were included because many moral issues were brought to them by 
the soldiers they served and. as such, they unwittingly collected a wealth of 
qualitative data for the author.
.All o f  the participants were presented with the Kohlberg dilemma o f the 
company com mander in Korea (Duska & Whelan. 1975. p. 122. also included in 
.Appendix B) and associated questions were asked. This was done to gain some 
appreciation for the manner in which they settled moral issues in combat and to 
assess the degree to which the officers took responsibility for moral issues.
Practical considerations limited the selection o f  participants to nearby 
areas, those being in central and west Texas, central Oklahoma, and the western 
part o f Virginia, based on the author's locale. These participants were identified 
through word-of-m outh to better establish rapport. M ost o f the participants 
interviewed in the pilot study were quick to mention that they were reluctant to 
discuss their com bat experiences with people who did not have similar
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experiences themselves. The author found it useful to ask those interviewed in 
the pilot study, “ Do you know of anyone else with similar experiences whom 1 
might interview?” This question usually resulted in suggestions for further 
participants, a technique that may be described as “snowballing." When 
contacting the next potential participant and explaining the nature of the research, 
the author found it to be a useful tool to mention that he had acquired that 
person's name through a colleague of his. In one occurrence, the person making 
tlie suggestion was good enough to contact the potential participant prior to the 
author's telephone call and explained the nature of this research. In that instance, 
rapport was easily effected, and the interview quickly uncovered a wealth o f 
information conceming the participant’s experiences.
Participants
The participants involved in this study were thirteen combat officer 
veterans who served in armed conflict ranging from World War 11 to the G ulf 
War. The length o f the interviews ran from two to four hours with the veterans 
being interviewed one or two times. Interviews were semi-structured, with a list 
o f  questions used by the author included as .Appendix A .  The participants were 
informed o f  the nature o f the study and were asked to sign a consent form, which 
also included a clause for audio taping the interview. Not all o f the participants 
were taped, as it was the author’s unfortunate realization two interviews into the 
research that he should have been taping all along. Those inter\ iews were 
conducted with the author taking extensive notes, which were then transcribed by 
the author later in the week. The taped interv iews were transcribed by a legal
secretary retained by the author. These transcriptions were analyzed to identify 
themes.
The veterans were given an assurance o f  anonymity by the author and, as 
such, pseudonyms are used throughout this work. It is the author's realization 
that, given the level o f intelligence and education o f the reader who is likely to 
peruse this work, the identity o f some of the participants could be discerned. The 
author requests that the reader not look upon this work as evidence for a trial (the 
material presented herein is oftentimes very emotionally charged and could lend 
itself to judgm ent statements about the veterans): rather, that it be used in the 
spirit for which it was intended, i.e. to illuminate the experience o f the officer gua 
the decision-maker in combat.
What follows is a list o f those thirteen officers and a short description of 
each, to include the number o f times, length, and setting o f the interviews in order 
that the reader may have a dramatis personae as a guide to this research.
Colonel .'\aron - COL .Aaron was inteiwiewed in his office at a National Guard 
Officer Candidate School. He was the commandant o f the school and was at first 
somewhat suspicious o f the study until he was assured that tlie author was not 
attempting to "dig up dirt” on the OCS process. He had never seen combat, but 
had served in the National Guard over 25 years. Inter\ iew notes were 
handwritten and then transcribed.
Captain Don - COL Aaron introduced me to CPT Don, who agreed to an 
interview over dinner lasting two and a half hours. Notes on this interview were
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handwritten and then transcribed. In addition to being the senior tactical officer 
(S-TAC) in charge o f  training the officer candidates, he also oversaw the honor 
committee at the OCS and served as a lay minister at his church, bringing a Bible 
to dinner with him. He had been in the National Guard for ten years, none o f 
which were spent in combat.
Lieutenant Matt - CPT Don introduced me to LT Matt, one o f the tactical officers 
(TAC) leading a platoon (about 30 soldiers) o f officer candidates. The interview 
lasted for about an hour and 15 minutes and notes were taken by hand, then 
transcribed. He had been in the National Guard for about two years and had never 
been in combat.
Major Mike - Two interviews were conducted, with the first running two hours 
and the second running one hour. The author contacted him by simply walking 
into the ROTC department o f a Midwestern university and asking the head 
professor if  he knew of anyone who would be appropriate for my research. .M.AJ 
Mike provided me with his personal copy o f M akin 's 1981 work. War. Morality, 
and the Military Profession, as well as his video copy of “Breaker M orant,” a film 
that deals with morality in war. Interviews were conducted in his office and were 
recorded by the author's wTitten notes. MAJ Mike served as an enlisted Air Force 
airman in Vietnam, as an officer in Latin America counter-drug operations, and as 
the operations officer o f  an artillery battalion in the G ulf War.
Officer Candidate Tom - One interview was conducted lasting for two and a half 
hours. The interview was recorded in writing by the author. We started the 
interview in the office o f  his supervisor and continued at a table in a barracks 
hallway (we were alone in the barracks). I contacted him through the 
commandant o f an officer training school in the Midwest, whom I had asked for 
leads o f  who might be appropriate for this research. OC Tom was an officer-in- 
training, but was enlisted for eight years as a sniper with the Navy SEALS in the 
G ulf War and in Latin .American counter-drug operations.
Chaplain James - Two interviews were conducted, with the first lasting two hours 
and the second lasting one hour. The interviews were taped and conducted in his 
office at his church in a Southwestern city. The author contacted him through a 
mutual friend. CHP James served as a chaplain to the Special Forces in Vietnam 
and was in contact with the moral concerns raised by many o f the officers and 
enlisted troops who were associated with irregular units.
Chaplain Bobby - Two interviews were conducted, with the first lasting one-and- 
a-half hours and the second lasting 45 minutes. The interviews were taped and 
conducted in his office at a Southwestern universit)'. where he coaches the track 
team. He was contacted through a mutual friend. CHP Bobby ser\'ed as chaplain 
to the 10P‘ Airborne Division in Vietnam and was aware o f the moral concerns o f  
that unit's members. CHP Bobby provided the author with eleven books and five 
videos pertinent to combat morality which are used to cross-reference the 
emerging themes.
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Colonel Jack - The first interview lasted two hours and the second lasted 30 
minutes. The interviews were taped and conducted at his home in the Southwest, 
where he is retired. He was contacted through CHP James. Jack was an infantry 
platoon leader with Patton’s Third Army in World War II and was in the first unit 
to cross the RJiine and then in the first American unit to see the inside o f a Nazi 
concentration camp. He served later in Vietnam and retired after serving over 30 
years in the Army. COL Jack provided the author with a copy of a Newsweek 
article on concentration camps and several letters describing his experiences.
Captain Todd - The first interview lasted two hours and the second lasted one 
hour. CPT Todd's interviews were taped and conducted first in his residence in 
the Southwest, then at his nearby office. He was contacted through a mutual 
friend and through CHP Jerry. CPT Todd was originally sent to Viemam as a 
combat engineer platoon leader and was then trained to become part o f the 
Special Forces.
Lieutenant Blake - One inter\ iew was conducted lasting two and a half hours.
The interview was taped and took place at a fast-food restaurant in the Southwest 
where his son works. He was contacted through CHP Bobby. LT Blake was sent 
to Vietnam as an infantry platoon leader. He provided the author with a packet of 
materials describing his experiences and some related news clippings.
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Colonel Franks - One taped interview lasted three hours and was conducted at his 
office at a Southeastern university. He was contacted through a mutual friend in 
the military. COL Franks was a first sergeant in the Marines in Korea and later a 
platoon leader lieutenant with the Marines in Vietnam, where he received the 
Medal o f Honor, the nation’s highest award, for his actions, .\fte r more than 40 
years o f martial service, he was still on active duty with the Marines at the time of 
the interview.
Colonel Brady - This gentleman had been working as a psychologist for the past 
fourteen years and is still on active duty with the Army at a post in the Southwest. 
During Vietnam, however. COL Brady was the leader o f an elite Patltfinder unit. 
One interview was conducted lasting three hours.
Lieutenant Able - LT .\b le  was contacted through M.'^J Mike and two interviews 
lasting a total o f  four hours were conducted over the telephone and taped using an 
adapter. LT Able was an infantry platoon leader in the Korean War and is 
working now as a minister in the Midwest.
In addition to the invaluable data provided by these veterans, material 
resources in the form o f books and videos were used to gain a better 
understanding o f the experience o f the officer in combat. A list o f  these materials 
is included as Appendix C.
Procedures
40
The method of qualitative inquiry carried several implications for the 
proposed research. First, reliance was be placed on the interview as the primary 
means o f  collecting data. The data desired for this research focused on the 
phenomenological experience o f  the combat veterans. A s  such, the questions 
asked o f the participants were, for the most part, phrased at the discretion o f the 
examiner. A list o f the m ost common and pertinent questions is included in 
.-\ppendix A, although the individualized focus on the subject resulted in some 
matters being probed and inquired further than others in the pursuit o f the 
participant’s story. The relation o f the veteran’s personal experiences was 
retrospective based on what he remembered about the war. The follow-up 
questions for Kohlberg's scenario of a company commander in Korea, however, 
were included in each interview (please see Appendix B).
.A review o f relevant documents was also an integral part o f  this research. 
Through the cooperation o f  local military libraries, the list of references named in 
.Appendix C was made available to the author. These references, relevant 
psychological literature, and other documents provided to the author through the 
interviewees were then evaluated for their content pertaining to the experience of 
the officer making moral decisions in combat. Through this combination of 
interviews and document review, it is hoped that a reasonable amount o f 
triangulation can illuminate an understanding o f  the experiences o f  the study’s 
participants.
This is what was desired for the methodology used in this research. It was 
clarified and revised as the data came in, but it is the author’s impression was that
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this answered concerns previously raised by the committee. The author also 
understands that there may be concerns raised about the intrusion o f subjectivity 
into this field o f  research. In an attempt to address such concerns, it would be 
beneficial for the reader to understand that the author's perspective comes as a 
person who has served 13 years in tlie armed services and is currently on active 
duty as a psychologist, though has never seen combat.
Results
What was obtained from these veterans were 22 cassette tapes o f 
interviews and about 50 pages o f handwritten notes. Efforts were then made to 
transcribe the tapes, some o f which was done by the author and some o f which 
was done through hired transcription services. Four different services were used, 
all kept under a contract o f  confidentiality until, ultimately, about 500 pages of 
transcribed interviews were produced. Once the hard copies were printed, the 
process o f  data analysis was begun.
After several attempts at making sense o f  tlie data, the author struck upon 
indexing each interview for relevant phrases, lines, and quotes. These passages 
were grouped according to similarity (e.g. - Two passages might be similar in that 
they both relate to the feelings o f patriotism and nationalistic fervor the veteran 
had while he was still training). In the original groupings, there were between 
130 to 150 patterns, which had shown no major improvements in manageability 
or “graspability" o f  the data from the 1,500 pages o f transcripts. Discarding the 
idea that only one pattern was necessary (William Tecumseh Sherman, who 
pillaged and ransacked Georgia in the War Between tlie States, sagaciously
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declared, “W ar is hell."), the myriad o f  various and sundry patterns were 
concentrated into the first eight patterns that appear below. A ninth pattern, the 
“wallow factor.” was finally added under the consideration that it was set apart 
enough from the others and important enough as to deserve its own, distinct 
mention.
These patterns were further condensed and, in some cases, eliminated 
altogether to better speak to the focus o f this research. Four patterns were 
eliminated as being less than relevant to the research questions and two o f  the 
remaining patterns were melded into other patterns to which they bore some 
similarity. Finally, three patterns remained to cover the patterns yet retain some 
cogency o f  theme across the veterans.
Following the establishment o f the patterns, passages that made it into the 
index were placed under the headings they best fit. sometimes under more than 
one. Through these inductive means, commonalities in the veterans' stories were 
gleaned from their interviews and arranged into three patterns that follow and are. 
hopefully, somewhat more manageable and coherent than the original data.
1 ) ITie officer has a desire for control over his environment.
2) .An officer feels responsible for the troops he leads into combat.
3) Distance seems to loosen the bonds o f what is morally acceptable, while 
proximity seems to produce a “wallow" factor o f remorse over the killing.
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This study will use these three themes in an attempt to tie together some of 
the patterns that seem to emerge from the data, illuminating each o f  the patterns 
with information taken from the interviews and from the literature.
The patterns that follow paint a picture o f leadership in combat and the 
phenomenology of the officer gua the combat leader and veteran - and especially 
as a moral agent. These are the patterns that seemed to arise from the answers the 
participants provided as the author saw fit to analyze the data.
Pattern 1 (Control over the environment)
The officer has a desire for control over the environment. Fighting is 
generally a state o f confusion, so the leader does his best to control what can be 
controlled. This control may extend to the troops in his command, the officer's 
own emotions, or even the players in the combat arena. This control directly 
impacts the officer's combat effectiveness and the “battlefield survivability" of 
his unit. This term refers to a unit's ability to still be intact once the shooting has 
stopped.
The following examples relate to the control an officer exerts over the 
troops in his command. This obedience is sometimes a matter o f life and death. 
COL Brady
His first experience in combat was when they were in a helicopter with his 
detachment. A lieutenant was with them who was not a Pathfinder and as they 
were about to land he told this lieutenant T need to go out first' and the lieutenant 
d idn’t say a word and jum ped out in front o f  him and as the lieutenant was 
jum ping out he took a round right in the face and it killed him instantly. He said
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after the lieutenant jumped out in front o f him he couldn’t take time to think about 
it right then or he would have wound up dead. So he went ahead and completed 
the mission and got back to the base then the thought about it. He thought that he 
had told the lieutenant not to jump out first, that he needed to jump first, but the 
lieutenant jum ped anyway.
Considering this scenario, there are several factors that attach easily to 
Konlogiannis’ (1996) characteristics o f emergency-tempo decision-making. The 
consequences o f failing to manage an emergency are highly stressful and 
potentially life threatening. In this situation, however, it was the threat to the life 
o f another that seems to have been the greatest concern and COL Brady was o f 
the opinion that, had he jum ped out first, it would have been in such a way as to 
evade the enemy gunfire. There is time pressure in accomplishing tasks in order 
to avoid escalation o f the emergency -  COL Brady knew that if he failed to get 
his men out o f  the aircraft quickly, then the enemy would destroy the aircraft and 
everyone on it.
Existing operating procedures offer little guidance in dealing with many 
unfamiliar aspects o f the emergency. Certainly there could be no standard 
operating procedure that would anticipate every possible scenario and give 
guidelines on how a platoon leader might react. Usually the best the militarv' is 
able to do is to provide some general ideas for dealing with six to eight different 
situations and hope that the officer can generalize from there. To provide more 
guidance may, in fact, limit the officer’s ability to be flexible in fluid situations, 
as well as inundating the officer with information overload.
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One o f  the ways officers exercise the control necessary to establish 
leadership is to establish principles that allow for a more parsimonious decision. 
“Choosing the best man for the job” may be one o f these ways, which leads to the 
finding that was unquestionably the most common pattern that tied all ten o f the 
combat veterans together and distinguished them from the three officers who had 
never seen combat. Appendix B contains the Kohlbergian dilemma o f the 
company commander in Korea. Bear in mind, though, that this was not an 
attempt to fix the officers at a particular stage of moral development. Rather, the 
dilemma o f the company commander in Korea was used as a means o f getting the 
veterans to think about moral decisions. These findings do seem interesting, 
however, and do seem to add to this research.
When asked about the dilemma, each of the ten combat veterans, leaders 
and chaplains alike, answered along some variation o f the theme. "I 'd  pick the 
best man to do the job.” Note the following examples:
Interviewer - “Should the captain order a man to stay behind, or stay behind 
himself, or leave nobody behind?”
LT Able - "The real answer is the one to do the job right, the man that's best 
qualified, knows what the hell they're doing. They'll be the one that will 
survive.”
46
COL Brady - “Oh. I think what I'd  try to do is not to send anybody back, but if it 
was required, I would send whoever I thought was the most capable o f  blowing 
up the bridge.”
CHP Bobby - “ ...If he is going to protect his troops, then 1 would say he...would 
generally leave somebody there w ho’s qualified to blow up the bridge and that 
may be one or two and they would have eapability o f  protecting themselves, could 
conceivably be killed, could conceivably be taken POW . but the greater good still 
is him taking care o f his own troops.”
CPT Todd - Either o f those would be the choice to make. 1 think you should take 
the guy that was going to get the job done.
CHP James - "...he should order somebody to stay back and the best guy to blow 
the bridge up.”
COL Franks - No. 1 think I'd  have to base it on who 1 thought would get the job 
done.
LT Blake - Sends the guy that can do the job, whoever that is. It doesn’t matter 
about the personal condition.
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COL Jack - He would pick the one he thought would do the job - best qualified to 
do the job  - the one most likely to succeed in doing the job and that's what he 
would base his decision on. H e'd base it on the mission, not the individual.
MAJ Mike - He said he would "pick the best man to get the job done," rather than 
choosing between a trouble maker or a man with a terminal illness.
OC Tom - "I'd  pick the best man for the job."
Those three officers who had not seen combat gave somewhat different 
approaches to the moral solution:
COL .Aaron - He reflected a moment before answering that he would resolve the 
issue by drawing straws to pick the one person who would stay behind. He 
decided that this would be most fair and that degree o f fairness would be 
important to maintain unit cohesiveness after tlie company was safe again.
CPT Don - He vacillated between picking the trouble-maker or the terminally ill 
soldier and finally said he would pick the ü’ouble-maker, "because the terminally 
ill guy might need some time to get his affairs in order...! don't know.”
LT Matt - The lieutenant said that he would pick the guy who was terminally ill to 
stay behind, adding that he hoped the trouble maker, “would feel his country is 
important enough to die for."
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These findings were not found to be consistent with other sources, though 
it was this issue that most clearly distinguished officers across any definable lines 
(combat versus non-combat) and resulted in a consistent response. The reasons 
for the differences in the answers are not entirely clear. In discussing this factor 
witli the various veterans, two suggested that there is a difference between the 
academic answer that students debate in the classroom and the practical answer 
that the leader implements in combat. While students might debate the answer in 
erudite terms, they are not there on the battlefield with all o f  the factors available 
to them, nor do they have any o f  the pressures. There seems to be a difference 
between the philosophical and the practical.
Further questioning o f  the combat leaders as to whether they would 
choose the terminally ill man or the troublemaker typically resulted in their 
“broken record technique" o f repeating their answer in a variety o f ways, all 
suggesting that the correct answer was whomever could best accomplish the 
mission. The veterans showed they would not be constrained by the choices 
available. Had they limited their choices to either the terminally ill man or the 
troublemaker, it may have suggested a rigidity o f thinking that would be 
inconsistent with the "on your feet” thinking necessar) on the battlefield, where 
the answers are rarely inscribed in a book for the platoon leader to consult in the 
thick o f  battle. Perhaps the most effective person to be in charge o f troops being 
sent into combat is someone who “colors outside the lines” and is not limited 
strictly to the obvious choices. The ability to “think outside the box” and devise 
new and creative ways to accomplish the mission is a characteristic shared by
49
those combat leaders who become the subject o f the erudite, philosophical 
discussions in the classrooms of West Point.
The genesis for the answer is not entirely clear. It is clear that it is not 
something that the officer learned through a training program. None o f  the 
combat officers could recall where they learned this answer to be the correct one. 
Had this been something they had learned through their training programs, then it 
would be plausible to assume that the officers at the officer training program (who 
had never seen combat) would have stated the same answer. It seems that the 
answer is something that is honed in an experiential base. Plausibly, one might 
say that this is the most easily défendable answer, not only to others who might 
later call the officer's decisions into question, but for the tougher interpersonal 
conflict when the officer examines the decisions himself. While this answer 
seems to be the most parsimonious, though, it is also an answer that allows the 
officers to avoid choosing an action that is provided in the dilemma.
Officers often have to perform tasks for which they have received little or 
no prior training. Each o f  the combat veterans interviewed voiced the sentiment 
that they, at one time or another in combat, felt unprepared. This is a theme that 
seemed to be consistent, but the wide variety o f responses on how that unprepared 
feeling might be rectified suggested that it would be difficult to impossible for a 
new lieutenant to ever feel completely at ease upon his first encounter with 
combat. The “trial by fire” seems to be a solemn initiation into a brutal world.
The moral training for the cadet seeking to become an officer typically 
involves classroom discussion on the matter. This is done by providing clear 
guidelines for the expected moral standard, such as “A cadet will not lie, cheat, or
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Steal or tolerate those who do.” Also, cases in moral reasoning are presented to 
the cadets and discussed in a seminar format. .Additionally, the cadets are 
expected to become conversant in role models who have grappled with moral 
decisions throughout history. .An example o f  this might be the case o f SGT Alvin 
York who, though impressed into ser\dce during World W ar I as a conscientious 
objector, saved the lives o f  his fellow soldiers by shooting and killing 22 o f  the 
enemy. More common case studies are presented as well, such as the armorer 
who is assisting an officer in conducting an arms room inspection. The armorer 
and the supply sergeant are both pressuring the junior officer to simply sign o ff on 
the inventory without making them pull each of the weapons for inspection 
(Department o f the .Army, 1990). Cadet training in moral and ethical issues lasts 
approximately two semesters o f the cadet's academic training.
The discussion has focused on the decision-making factors involved when 
a soldier is in harm 's way. Getting a soldier to take a life is another matter. The 
opening paragraph o f this article discusses the conditions that facilitate mass 
killings and mention the crucial factor o f displacing responsibility.
“The Vietnam war machine fulfilled Sanford and Com stock's (1971 ) two 
enabling prerequisites for the creation o f  mass executioners: the dehuminization 
o f  victims and social permission for collective destructiveness. As M ilgram 's 
(1963, 1965, 1967, 1974) studies o f obedience suggest, the principle o f 
authoritative sanction functions even in the absence o f warfare. Most o f 
M ilgram ’s participants followed orders unquestioningly - even if  it meant 
harming others - as long as two conditions were met: (1) the instructions came 
from someone in a position of authority and (2) the setting made the tormentor
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dependent upon that authority. If the victim could be rendered remote or faceless, 
the tendency to inflict pain on command was even greater. A victim can become 
faceless if  his head is tied in a bag; he can become remote if  he is 5,000 feet 
below the warrior (Shatan, 1978, p. 43).
The officer is often cognizant o f the fact that the killing for which he is 
responsible collects an emotional toll that is best divided among his command. 
Though he orders it, the officer is generally not the one directly responsible for 
the killing. In this sense, the killing is “easier said than done."’
There is such a thing as too much control to the point o f micro 
management, which can compromise a unit's effectiveness. This micro 
management might take the form o f the colonel who hovers above his troops in a 
helicopter and telling them over the radio to button their chin straps on their 
helmets (LT Blake reported this). Such a level o f control has a demoralizing 
effect on the troops and can extend to the point o f putting the unit at risk. .4s 
stated before, some degree o f  flexibility is necessary to allow the combat leader to 
“think on his feet" as the person who is most aware o f the situation.
The officer's control extends across so many areas o f  the soldiers' lives 
and has a very real impact on the stabilitj’ and morale o f  the unit. .4lso. the 
confidence that the troops feel in their leader is an important matter o f  functioning 
and survival. If that faith is not present, neither will be the command and control 
necessary for the troops to follow the leader into battle. This facet o f control, in 
turn, has direct bearing on the moral climate within the unit. COL Franks spoke 
to the moral influence the leader had on his subordinates.
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COL Franks Davis was the squad leader - a corporal - and I was one o f  th e .. .in 
the Marines, that squad breaks down into fire teams of four men 
each - you never really have four men in combat, but you still have 
something like three fire teams built around a Browning Automatic 
Rifle. .\nd , you always had the three rifle teams even if  you didn’t 
have but three Marines in the squad - each one o f them had a 
Browning Automatic Rifle.
Interviewer: So, Corporal Davis was your direct superior. I suppose?
COL Franks Yes, he was. I guess when it gets down to moral issues, the
example o f Minyard in that 3rd Squad - 3rd Platoon team in the 
Korean War. Once we were moving and we took ten - we crapped 
out alongside the road and Minyard is walking along with a gook 
hand stuck on his bayonet on his carbine, and he would walk up 
behind a guy and lay this hand over as he was laying there just 
kind o f sleeping - rub his face with that hand - that K orean's hand, 
or it could've been a Chinese hand. But, I didn't think that was 
funny, but 1 have never had any schooling on that, but tha t's  doing 
something with a body, even if it's the enemy’s, that I had trouble 
with accepting it and I never really accepted Minyard because of 
that - because he did several things along that line. .\nd . Corporal 
Davis wouldn’t stand for that for a minute. And. not only made 
him get rid o f it, but took him off to the side and chewed his ass 
out. .\nd . I don’t know what all was said, but I felt good that 
Davis did that - that he didn’t let something like that happen.”
Because it made one soldier feel good that Davis intervened, it is plausible 
to assume that other soldiers felt good about the decision as well. That, in turn, 
will have a small but real impact when soldiers ask themselves that crucial 
question, “Do I have faith in my leader?” In the above example, several o f Rest's 
components may be called to mind (Rest, 1984). Davis was able to interpret the 
situation as a moral dilemma and. possibly, recognized that M inyard's actions 
were unsettling for at least one soldier and it was degrading to the dead body, 
albeit an enemy. Davis could easily have followed other courses o f action, such 
as allowing Minyard to continue his horseplay with the severed hand. We may 
not know what courses o f action formed Davis' constellation o f choices. What 
Davis did, however, showed respect for the enemy dead, the laws o f warfare 
(which clearly state that such mutilation is illegal), and M inyard's own dignity; 
rather than correcting Minyard in front o f the others. Davis took him off to the 
side.
. \  major aspect o f this control pertains to rigidly controlling the lives of 
the soldiers, which raises the question o f whether this control is moral in nature. 
Kant made sharp distinctions between moral issues and non-moral ones (Kant.
1994a) and it may be difficult at first to understand how this can become a moral 
issue until one realizes the end purpose for that control. Military discipline has 
been foimd to be the decisive ingredient in warfare for thousands o f years. The 
combat officer knows that if his troops are not trained properly in garrison, they 
will be found lacking on the field o f combat. The troops may openly loathe the 
leader who makes them conduct rigorous physical training and endless series of 
drills to hone their com bat skills. However, the leader who is remiss in this
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training (possibly out o f  a desire for acceptance or wanting to please the troops) 
will find that his soldiers died on the battlefield because they were not properly 
prepared, while the more harsh leader takes fewer casualties. Imposing that 
control, can be viewed as, at least, a necessary condition enabling subsequent 
moral decision making by the officer. Issues become moral when lives are at 
stake. It would be accurate to say that the control becomes a moral issue if it is 
not established, as lives will be lost on the battlefield. If the control is 
implemented and fully in place, it may not necessarily be a moral issue (e.g.. if 
the fully-trained and disciplined soldier never saw combat).
W hen control is taken away, it can be a very unsettling experience. Being 
out o f control may mean that there is little combat intelligence available for the 
leader, it may mean the leader is wounded and recovering at a hospital away from 
his command (When this happened, COL Jack had his men string a telephone into 
the infirmary so he could keep posted on his unit), or it may mean that their 
position is being ovemm by the enemy. LT Blake is still traumatized by 
memories o f  two different occasions when half o f the men in his command died 
during enemy actions. In any case, the officers agreed that, without that control, 
loss o f  one 's  troops may well be the result.
Also note that the above statement reflects a degree o f conflict between 
the moral responsibility the officer has towards his troops and the moral 
responsibility he has toward the enemy. In one hypothetical view, a "scorched 
earth” policy where the enemy terrain is turned into a wasteland may well make 
things easier on the troops (and save troop lives), but its moral correctness would
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be called to question. Precedent to address this question comes may be found in 
an issue arising during the Spanish-American War. Tichenor (1975) relates:
i n  the Philippines in 1902, Brigadier General Jacob Smith 
gave this order, i  want no prisoners. 1 wish you to kill and bum.
The more you kill and bum, the better you will please me. The 
i n t e r i o r  s u m m a r  must be made a howling wildemess. Also, all 
persons capable o f  bearing arms, those ten years old and older, are 
to be killed.' Smith was convicted by court martial. He was 
sentenced, however, to be reprimanded primarily because his 
soldiers refused to execute his orders."
The officer realizes that tlie true object of war is to effect a lasting 
peace between two nations. .As such, the term "economy o f force” is the 
first principle o f leadership. Clearly stated, the officer knows that the best 
strategy in warfare is to use the minimum amount o f force necessary to 
accomplish the mission. .After all the combat is put aside, the officer must 
still realize that he is fighting the enemy for political reasons, not military 
ones. This goes back to the writings o f  St. Augustine around 400 A.D., 
who Navigating this doctrinal flux was St. Augustine, who wTote 
around 400 .A.D. and who formulated the directive that the final goal o f  a 
just war is peace (W akin, 1981).
Dewey (1959) discusses the moral motivational theory and 
demonstrated that people have a desire to act in a noble light. Other
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psychologists have found that empathy forms a connectedness with the 
species in most people (Erikson, 1958; Hoffman, 1976). The 1989 study 
by Zanden (1989) showed that education leads one past prejudice to foster 
social responsibility and an orientation toward service. The officers do 
indicate that their desire is to act morally and that some degree o f empathy 
and an orientation for social service exists even for the enemy. Officers 
are required to have a baccalaureate degree and those who stay in will 
have to pursue graduate study. Perhaps these factors work to combine in 
the officer some foundation of pro-social behavior upon which they can 
build a moral edifice.
The officer in combat takes on the role o f a manager, coordinating aid and 
supporting fire once the unit comes into contact with the enemy. Through this, he 
exerts his control on his physical environment. The role o f the officer as the 
manager on the battlefield - the executive coordinating the action and deciding 
where to spend his assets - is a theme that seems common among the officers, 
with eight officers spontaneously reporting this aspect o f control. When 
questioned, all agreed that the officer should not find him self directly 
participating in the killing, but rather organizing and coordinating the efforts o f 
those who do.
•Another aspect o f  control is the control an officer must exert over himself. 
COL Jack spoke clearly to this issue.
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COL Jack
•“Was I scared when I started? Yeah, a little bit when I went to combat. 1 
was scared to death but 1 could not show my men that 1 was scared. 1 can 
remember when we had a very difficult struggle fighting thinking ‘W on’t this war 
ever end? Is there an end coming at a iP ’ and I wasn’t sure whether I'd  be around 
or not. First man 1 ever saw blown to bits I threw up. The second one 1 threw up, 
and then I got hard and then you wait a little bit and then you go through the same 
cycle again. In reading tlie biography on Patton, he went through the same thing. 
You can 't let yourself dwell on that too much. A man who says he was never 
scared, he was either lying or bragging. I think everybody who has ever been in 
combat has been scared. The question is harnessing the fear, swallowing it and 
doing what you're supposed to do.”
This aspect o f self-discipline is a common undercurrent o f an officer’s 
self-view, with all o f the other combat veterans reporting the same thing. .All 
admitted freely to being scared when in combat, but they could also agree that the 
fact that they were alive and available to be inter\'iewed served as a testimony to 
their clear thinking on the field o f battle.
In addition to suppressing his own emotions, an officer must also keep it 
to him self if  he feels the decisions o f his higher echelons are less than exemplary. 
If the enlisted soldiers sense a discord between their platoon leader and the 
company commander (the platoon leader’s direct superior), a breakdown of 
discipline will almost certainly follow. “Maintaining one’s bearing” as an officer 
is something that requires constant attention. One thing this seems to do is to
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allow some distance to be maintained between the officer and the troops. This 
distance then allows for the officer to be the one giving the orders that send troops 
to kill or be killed. The issue o f control, then, provides a necessary context which 
allows the other two patterns to develop.
Pattern 2 (the officer is responsible for troops)
.An officer feels responsible for the troops he leads into combat. To some 
degree, this may be a factor o f the control demonstrated in Pattern 1. CPT Todd's 
story seems to dovetail with the need for control that the first pattern 
demonstrated and how that need for control couples with preservation o f self and 
others to motivate him to learn his job.
CPT Todd
I learned a lot in 6 months [during his officer candidate school and 
officer basic course]. Got to Viet Nam to promptly find out that I didn't know 
Jack shit! ! (chuckle) You really and truly do lead because, as a brand new second 
lieutenant who is 20 or 21 years old. going into a unit where people have already 
been shot at a few times, you aren’t going to go tell them to do much. You better 
dam well get out in front o f  them and hope that they follow you. .And. they 
frequently don’t (chuckle) because they know what you are doing is stupid and 
wrong and they aren’t gonna do it because they have been there long enough to 
recognize it. So. if you 're  really lucky, you get to slink back to where they are 
and avoid further embarrassment or possibly worse. And, after a  relatively short 
period o f  time, you begin to learn some o f the same things they know. The
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training program there was much more beneficial than the one in the States-they 
had much higher levels o f  an incentive. A (chuckle) weekend pass didn’t mean 
near as much in the second school as it did in the first. And, it didn't matter how 
many pushups you had to do in OCS, believe me, it didn’t matter--the punishment 
level was much higher, so you learned quick.”
For CPT Todd, then, that responsibility fueled his desire to learn 
everytliing he could about his job as a platoon leader so that he would not let his 
team down. .411 o f the combat officers expressed similar feelings along these 
lines, where their motivation stemmed from a sincere desire to uphold their 
subordinates.
LT .4ble: The other things where my moral dilemma came to a head, oh our
platoons were and our companies were oversized and I had about 
80 o f these young men in my platoon. I’m a second lieutenant and 
the first in combat because you’re the one that's responsible for 
their well being in giving them directions to do the right thing. 1 
was somewhat overwhelmed with my responsibility. 1 mean just to 
think that all these lives were my responsibility even though others 
up the line shared that same responsibility. Like I said reality was 
very bright and very clear as you stood looking at these young 
guys in the eyes and they had wives, families, sweethearts, all 
kinds o f stuff and you recognized that if  you were out on a patrol 
or on area and then you went under attack you make the wrong
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decision you can cause them to lose their lives and that was the 
first, tliat was my hardest one to get over and I finally just got to 
the point where I said to myself that I 'm  just gonna have to do the 
very best I can and hopefully, God willing, I w on't lose anybody 
but I'm  just gonna do the best I can, that's  all I can do right now. 
Otheiwise you get immobilized.
Here is a theme that was central to all 13 officers, where the combat leader 
must balance the values o f completing tlie mission and o f caring for his men. If 
the scales tip too heavily to one side or the other, the unit will become ineffective. 
The aspect o f being immobilized also seems to relate to the discussion offered by 
some officers concerning the difference between the philosophical discussions of 
the classroom and the more practical, utilitarian thinking that gets the job done in 
the combat arena.
CPT Todd also spoke o f the immobilizing aspect o f being overwhelmed in 
his job. Showing sincere loyalty to subordinates and upholding the troops was a 
feeling that ran deeply through the combat veterans. Conversely, any sense of 
“having let the troops down" is difficult for an officer to bear, as CPT Todd 
shows.
CPT Todd: Great sense o f failure, my sense o f  failure is that I was
inadequately trained. I was inadequately prepared emotionally to 
do the job that had to be done. I was inadequately equipped. We 
were so ghastly, with the level o f preparation that was criminal. 
That wasn’t my fault, that was criminal at levels above me. The 
training was criminal at the level above me, I mean criminal.
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Probably should have been tried, people should be tried for putting 
troops on the ground that aren’t trained or equipped and prepared. 
Emotionally well maybe not, I don’t know that you can train 
somebody at that level of emotion, but the rest o f it should never 
have been permitted to happen.
Immanuel Kant discussed using others as an end in themselves or as a 
means only. One veteran had his perspective firmly in place through his 40-plus 
years in the Marines and seems to find how he can direct his troops into harm's 
way and do so as an end in itself. While his approach to moral problem-solving 
may not be aligned with principled, post-conventional thought, it is apparent that 
he has struggled with these toughest o f  moral issues and developed an answer that 
allowed for the greatest flexibility o f application as he carried out his duties.
COL Franks: Yeah, the bottom line o f all that, though. 1 think, when you wrestle 
with it a little bit and after you've been with the thought a little bit. 
you realize that’s why we are all in this uniform - to take the fight 
to the enemy. So, that young Marine that's going forward - that's 
going to die - that I’ll never see again, signed up for that very thing 
- to take the fight to the enemy. So. it's not me and my choice and 
my decision for personal gain to send him forward into the 
enemy’s guns - w e’re both in the uniform and, uh. neither o f us 
would have it any other way. Take the fight to the enemy and it's 
a known factor that there will be a cost - there will be the dead and
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the wounded, the maimed for life, and, in some cases, those are the 
hardest. But, I think that when a commander wrestles with that 
thought, that it’s not him sending them forward, it 's  the whole 
Marine idea - tha t’s why the taxpayers paid you all that money all 
that time and trained you to where you are - to do this thing that 
you’ve got to do. And. because somebody falls, that’s the price 
that’s extracted and that poor individual - or worse, his family - is 
the one that has to pay for it. And, o f course, family is the one that 
really hurts because the dead man, 1 guess, has no feelings, but... 
.And, his buddies that he leaves behind - that make it through it.
This perspective shows some of the "wallowing" that will be seen in the 
third pattern and. in the strictest military sense, seems to have been the most 
effective view in not only getting the combat leader to do his job, but to be able to 
live with it afterwards. Also, it shows a clear standard for what constitutes justice 
on the battlefield.
In this pattern, the officer shows a great deal o f responsibility for those he 
leads into combat. As such, there is often a strong emotional attachment that the 
officer feels for his troops. His loyalty to them fuels his desire to do his very best 
and to thoroughly learn his job  and perform his duties.
The antithesis o f that loyalty to his troops is his directive to place those 
same troops into harm ’s way. How these differing constructs become synthesized 
is often at the root o f retrospective conflict and guilt that an officer feels for his 
actions in combat. Out o f the feeling o f responsibility the officer has for his
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combat troops, then, is a feeling o f  guilt when his troops are wounded. CPT Todd 
spoke o f his own mental anguish in the years after his service in Vietnam.
CPT Todd: You feel like laying down and pulling a poncho over your head
and not letting anybody talk to you, which is what some people do 
and probably what all o f us have done to some extent, years 
afterwards, just rolled up in our poncho and not let anybody talk to 
us but that is the single most...That time frame, that one day. was 
the turning point for everything that happened in my life. 1 think 
that that splendid isolation that 1 was sinking in was one that 1 
sought for many years after that. I spent many years in deep grief 
over each one o f these kids. I was able to blank it out completely. 
lnter\dewer: What was it like for you to send troops into combat?
CPT Todd: It's the hardest thing in the world you can do. And you will be
grief stricken over it for the rest o f  your life but you have to do it.
The other combat leaders reported the same moral regret. Another 
common theme in responses involving a leader's troops dying under his command 
involved the leader wishing he could have traded places with the ones who died.
A second-hand perspective comes from Chaplain Bobby in dealing with a combat 
leader facing the most harrowing sense o f  remorse from accidental fratricide.
Interviewer: 1 want to ask the same question about what problems did the
soldiers bring to you, but this time, let’s focus on the officers, and.
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I notice there’s a little bit o f  difference that officers have in combat 
in saying to one o f  their subordinates, “You run over to this 
position,” and the soldier stands up to do it and gets shot in the 
process. The officer then has a lot o f guilt about that because the 
death was his responsibility.
CHP Bobby: Uh-huh. 1 saw some elements of that, yes. Let me give you a
major example that stayed in my memory all these years. Do you
know who C O L  is? He's the founder, or the head of, what
was the group? What did we call them in the .Army? Um, the 
Special Action Group - not Special Forces - um. the group that 
went to Iran to bring the out prisoners, you know, try to do the
rescue - they had a special name. C O L  was an airborne
ranger colonel out o f the 101st .Airborne when 1 was there. W hen 1 
knew him in Viet Nam, he was a battalion commander - lieutenant 
colonel. Um. but as an 0 -6  [colonel], he commanded the .Army 
portion o f the group that flew into Iran to try to get the prisoners 
out. .And, he was the one who actually said to them to abort the 
mission after the planes had crashed into each other. We had two 
or three battalions out in the Ashau Valley and heavy contact, and 1 
was out there with them for part o f that time - was with the sister 
battalion to his - he was commanding the 2nd Battalion with the 
327th Infantry and he was up in the firebase, and I was on the 
firebase waiting to catch a helicopter back to the unit in the jungle, 
and I was standing beside him and he was listening to a radio. One
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o f his companies came under fire and they had called in gunships 
[heavily armed helicopters] to help them, and, uh, suddenly his 
unit commander was yelling, “Call them off, call them off - they’re
hitting us, they're hitting us!” And, it was friendly fire. C O L ____
got it stopped. Talked to the company commander, whom I knew 
very well, talked to him on the radio, saying, "Okay, cool it, calm 
down, find out what’s going on. protect your wounded and come 
back up on the radio and tell me what’s happening. ' Uh. so 1
stayed there with C O L  and he started talking -1 was the only
one with him - he started talking about this, um, this battalion, or 
this company commander and his concern that the guy wouldn’t be 
able to deal with everything that was happening, and his feeling o f 
loss if  any o f those soldiers got tom up. Well, when his unit
commander came back on, he said -  C O L  asked him. "What
have you got wounded?” And the guy said, “I'm  prepared to 
e \ acuate six football teams. " Now, he used that figure for security 
reasons on a radio. Do you know how many that is?
Interviewer; Sixty-six?
CHP Bobby: Sixty-six. You’ve got an infantry company with eighty-seven.
How many does that leave? Not verj' m any... Then, C O L ____
put down the radio and he turned around and started...he laid his 
head on the sandbags and started beating his head and his hands 
against the sandbags and started crying. Did that for two or three
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minutes, ju st really bawling, and then pulled out his handkerchief, 
wiped his face and said, “Sorry.”
This was the only report that discussed an instance o f  fratricide 
specifically. Note, however, that nine o f the ten combat veterans had a strong 
feeling o f  remorse so as to hold themselves responsible for deaths regardless o f 
which side pulled the trigger.
Other sources seem to report similar sentiments o f  attachment to the 
troops and profound rem orse when troops are lost. The following quote helps to 
illuminate the remorse that the combat leader feels at the loss o f  a fellow soldier 
and the trepidation with which he sends a soldier into battle.
“For me to lose a  friend in combat, in battle, is like losing part of my own 
body. 1 personally take it very, very hard. It takes me many, many months to 
recover. 1 probably develop some way o f keeping it from being shown outside, 
but one way 1 deal with it is I stay in very close relationships with his family and 
the people who remain after him and I tr>’ to participate in any effort of keeping 
his name, the stories about him. alive. People ask me how can 1 send a man to 
die? I tliink it is possible for me because 1 know that 1 am in the same 
circumstances and could die tomorrow and, if  I live to see tomorrow. I am lucky, 
but 1 also know that 1 m ust live with the thought o f those young men I sent out to 
die. That is the only way I am able to do it.” General Yosi. Israeli Defense 
Forces (Soldiers, 1989).
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The officer, then, is placed in an unenviable position where he must bond 
with his troops with a blend of affection and responsibility. He must also be 
willing to give the orders that will result in the deaths o f those men.
No m atter how well the leader is trained or how contentiously he performs 
his duties, the m ost unchanging part o f warfare is that people die. The distance 
that is part o f an officer's bearing exists so that the officer may give the orders 
that send his men into mortal danger, then shield the officer from the guilt that 
follows their deaths. The very best o f leaders will make some mistakes that will 
continue to plague them for years to come. Most combat leaders go through some 
processing akin to that o f a football coach conducting a post-game analysis to 
help the team do better next time. Usually, there is also some thinking on the 
officer's part that if he had done something differently, deaths could have been 
prevented.
Pattern 3 (distance vs. wallowing)
Distance seems to loosen the bonds o f  what is morally acceptable, while 
proximity seems to produce a “wallow" factor o f  remorse over the killing. This 
distance can be conceptualized in three different ways. It can imply the physical 
proximity that the soldier has between him self and the enemy he kills. "Distance" 
may also mean the time that separates the soldier’s actions from his memory of 
them in the present day. Lastly, it can be taken to mean the emotional distance 
that separates the soldier from the enemy he kills (as mentioned in the earlier 
discussion o f  Sanford and Comstock’s 1971 research).
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CPT Todd talks here about the emotional distance when he was invited to 
speak at a school for juvenile offenders (often gang members who had committed 
drive-by shootings).
CPT Todd: I’ve also worked at the something we call the Academy which is
where w e’ve got the kids that have been thrown out of the high 
school and most o f them were pretty rough kids. 1 said, "You 
know, you've been real tough, probably done some real tough 
things, but have you ever wallowed in it?” 1 said. "That’s the 
difference.” That was a real effective way to get everybody's 
attention. This kid was. he had been accused o f some drive by 
shootings. I don't know that he had actually done them but if  he 
hadn 't physically done them he was probably in the car. He 
probably really didn’t care whether somebody had gotten killed out 
there, it didn’t matter at all. but he hadn’t had their brains and 
things splattered all over him.
These "up-close-and-personal” images seem to be the hardest for the 
combat veteran to forget. The more the distance between the killer and the victim 
is closed, the more psychological trauma seems to result. This distance seems to 
protect some o f the players on the battlefield from the emotional scars this 
"wallowing” produces. .As a collective whole, pilots seem to carry little o f  the 
emotional burden shouldered by the troops on the ground. Contrary to popular
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opinion, the B-29 pilots who dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki exhibit no indications o f psychological problems (Grossman, 1995).
Direct participation in killing is not a necessary factor in producing this 
debilitating rumination that results from wallowing. OC Tom talks in the second 
person about this remorse in the combat veteran who witnesses civilian deaths 
during Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf.
OC Tom: In Iraq, the U.S. bombed a civilian building - Iraq had moved
civilians out and had put military equipment in. 450 civilians who
were told by the Iraqis to find shelter in the building were bombed 
in one instance and it really screwed up the guy who painted the 
building [He is referring here to designating the target with a laser 
spot. The SEAL is told which building to "paint" with the laser 
and he then makes sure that the laser remains on the building until 
the Coalition aircraft has successfully demolished the building with 
a laser-guided bomb. This usually means that the SEAL is 
painting and watching the whole affair from the higher roof o f 
another nearby building.]. It really fucked him up bad. That guy 
had to be transferred to non-combat duties. As a sniper, you 
assume the target is legal and legitimate.
Creating an emotional distance from the person who is to be killed seems 
to be the gateway to being able to kill the enemy. People who grew up working 
on a ranch know the expression, “Don’t get too close to the cattle,” referring to 
keeping a healthy emotional distance from an animal that will eventually be sent
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to the slaughterhouses. Shades o f  that distance exist between the officer and his 
soldiers. It exists to a much greater degree between the soldier and the enemy 
whom he must kill.
Interviewer: I'm  wondering, when you went through that enemy position after
the artiller)' attack, was there any emotion attached with that"’
LT Able: Sure, I mean even though they were terrible enemies. It's  still
something to see that they're people, are lifeless, and you don’t 
know if it’s because o f whether you called it in or somebody else 
called it in. but you can’t help but feel some kind o f  a tinge o f 
moral pain. O f course. I was not in combat all that long. 1 would 
imagine those guys that were in WWII and fighting for two years, 
they must have been absolutely numb.
Dehumanization seems to be a major component o f  that distance. 
Interviewer: Well, that brings me to another question I wanted to ask. What
were some o f  the views that you have - first, o f the Koreans, and 
later, the Vietnamese. Was there any particular view that you 
espoused?
COL Franks: .As the enemy? No. in that environment, they 're really not human.
They are something that has to be contended with and. uh. I never 
had any problem with drawing a bead on one and dropping him. I 
never thought twice about it because that’s the job - that was the 
thing that had to be done. I never really thought too much about 
the enemy.
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LT Able: Well I was kind o f indoctrinated into a strangely...the South
Koreans were good people, nice people. D idn’t want to fraternize 
with them too much. Now there was opportunity if you were 
looking o f a Korean hooker, but their food and their whole culture 
was so foreign to me and everything. They were nice people and I 
was glad we were there to protect them and all that stuff. I had that 
kind o f glossy thinking. But if they were North Korean, why, of 
course they were some kind o f less-than-human person, which was 
part o f that indoctrination.
Interviewer: That's interesting.
LT .Able: And particularly if they were Chinese they just didn't come high
up o ff o f  it. They kind o f were in the same categor\% The Chinese 
they were better fighters, we knew that from the beginning. When 
you're up against Chinese outfits you'd better be on your toes, 
because they were good. The North Koreans were pretty sloppy, 
they used broadcast epistles over loud speakers, everything, so 
they used to keep us in stitches. So we thought they w eren't being 
serious. But the Chinese, they would come after you so you knew 
that you had to get with it to get with the Chinese but even so 
because they were two things, they were Chinese and communist: 
“There’s communists in our state department, senator!” There 
were communists over there too. But there was a double hatred. 
And I spent my studies o f that since then certainly, like in the
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holocaust how the Germans, everybody, felt about Jews, gypsies 
and Hungarian people. They were somewhat less than human and 
if you can degrade a person to less than a fully human status, it's 
much easier to kill them.
Intcn.’icwcr: I think it's interesting that on your way to Korea, before you got
there, it was common to hear “gooks," "slant eyes," "rice eaters." 
and then you had to work with South Koreans. Was it difficult to 
make that distinction?
LT Able: No, it's pretty funny now that you make that...this is the crazy
thing about indoctrination, or call it nationalism if  you'd like, that 
if  you're on our side, you're okay. I may not always like the way 
you dress or look but by golly if  you're gonna fight with me and 
you're gonna be on my team, you're alright. I’ll drink your saké 
with you or whatever, but if  you're one o f  those strange folks that 
are fighting us - and particularly if you're communist and Oriental 
- it's not okay. It's  the psychology, you probably read up on this, 
by golly this is what motivates people to go ahead and get into 
combat and kill people. If you think every time you eliminate 
some o f those people that you’re doing your country and the world 
a favor, wow, you’re on a high mission. A theor}' which I 
subscribe to now is that unless you can dehumanize your enemy, 
vou can’t kill them.
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This last point is one that is well made. To be able dehumanize the enemy 
before one must kill them opens the way to justifying the killing afterwards. It 
does, however, leave the door open for an array o f possible conflicts and 
inconsistencies. There are countless stories from the battlefield o f  a soldier who 
shoots the enemy and then comes across some item that makes the enem y's 
“human-ness” confront him in stark reality. For LT Able, this moment came 
when he saw an enemy body lying on a stretcher, covered by a sheet, with the arm 
sticking out to the side. The arm was graced with a wedding ring, which was 
sufficient to cause that emotional distance to crumble.
Taking the “human-ness” out of the enemy can be accomplished in several
ways.
COL Franks: This one time going out by truck, and I'm seated on the tailgate - at 
the tailgate - and we just went around a sharp hairpin turn on this 
dirt, mountain trail. 1 became aware that the thing that we had just 
passed over was a human body, mashed as flat as that paper laying 
in that cold, that frozen dust o f that road. An enemy body, but that 
bothered me the fact that all these trucks in this convoy just kept 
tooling around that turn - running over that body and, literally, just 
made a paper doll out o f it, mashed it that flat. That bothered me 
for a good bit until I reasoned it out, and. on that mountain trail, 
the driver, one, wouldn’t see it until he was already on top o f it. 
and if  he’d stopped the way we rolled - and then to kind o f count 
our ambushes - if  he’d stopped that quickly, it would have been a
74
pile-up o f  trucks behind him. Then, I took that thought one step 
further, and that could’ve been exactly what the enemy planned to 
have us do - lay that body out there and the trucks stopping and 
opening up with an ambush. So, that was the only thing to do and 
that's war and that's the way war is. but it does tend to make us a 
little bit...we tend to lose some o f the human element in the 
individual, and as long as we are bothered by it like I was, 1 guess 
that's all right. But, if we ever get to the point where that doesn’t 
bother you. then I think we need to be concerned. .And. 1 see that 
in our society today, in young people killing each other. 1 don't 
think we have that kind o f concern for human life. But. is that 
along the lines o f the moral...that's not really decision making. All 
I'm  doing is sitting there on the tailgate watching something that’s 
already happened, but it had happened, and 1 was uncomfortable 
with the happenings.
LT Blake: No. 'cause a lot o f it just flew over your head. I remember the sign
that said. "O ur job is to help you help Charlie give his life for his 
country." I remember that. You were talking about morals and all 
that shit. I’ll tell you a story . 1 never participated in any atrocities. 
1 never cut any ears off or anything like that. There was our 
battalion - we were called the “Black Lions.’’ first o f the 28th 
Infantry, and somehow, there was a tradition started. We wore 
stars over there and you know, you hear all this shit - well, they got
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a bounty on our heads and all that stuff - probably not true, they 
d idn’t give a shit, ju st get outta my country. Everybody carried 
toothbrushes - extra toothbrushes. And when you killed a gook 
you stuck the toothbrush in their nose and you kicked the shit out 
o f - you kicked it up in his head. .And you’d leave him there with a 
toothbrush in his head, in his nose. Most o f my guys did that shit.
I didn’t ever do it.
Interviewer: How was that significant?
LT Blake: 1 don't know. It was Just paybacks, 1 guess. For how we felt like
they treated us, or how they would treat us.
Interviewer: Well, this is interesting. I mean, on one hand you're talking about
the NVA as being...
LT Blake: Yeah, they're good soldiers.
Interviewer: That was sort o f dehumanizing - maybe they're an inferior breed?
LT Blake: How else can you - how you gonna kill them if you don 't think
they’re worth a shit!? And, they're trying to kill you.
When that distance is closed and the victim is suddenly “human again.” 
though the victim be the enemy, a certain angst or “wallowing’’ seems to be 
produced.
The world o f tlie sniper presents a moral perspective that is a sharp 
contrast to that o f the infantryman at this juncture. OC Tom. who was a sniper in 
the Navy Seals during the Persian G ulf War and then in counter-drug operations 
in Latin America, explained that, if  a sniper is doing his job correctly, no one will 
ever be shooting back. This puts the “wet work” o f a sniper -  killing an unarmed
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enemy in cold blood -  a hairline away from murder, but for the fact that the 
orders for these actions com e from the authority o f a sovereign nation.
For the infantryman, however, it is clear that he either kills the enemy or 
he will be killed by the enemy. This is an important distinction. A  supply 
sergeant who had been in Vietnam laughed at the label o f  “conscientious 
objector.” He had known many boys who professed that they were conscientious 
objectors when they came to Vietnam and would never, under any circumstances, 
be made to kill another human. As soon as the first Viet Cong bullet or 
bombshell landed next to them, however, they were flat on their stomachs 
unloading their magazines at the VC with all the relish and enthusiasm o f  a 
Hollywood war hero. They realized that they either kill the enemy or they 
themselves will die. If a sniper is doing his job correctly, however, no one will 
ever be shooting back. Sometimes even the most outspoken proponents for non­
violence may concede that killing is necessary.
LT .^ble: Well see, Dietrich Bonhoeffer was a pastor for years and didn't
believe in that [the Nazi regime] and o f course it was through his 
family connections - his father was a psychiatrist and had all kinds 
of...he was able to evade the draft, but he was one o f  those who 
was part o f  the conspiracy to kill Hitler. The reason, his rationale 
was. as much as he abhorred killing, he felt that the killing o f one 
man would save literally millions o f  lives. (53)
Note that Sergeant .Mvin York, the most decorated hero o f  World War 1 
and recipient o f the Medal o f  Honor, was flatly opposed to killing when he was 
impressed into martial service. In his unique situation, however, he saw the
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deaths o f the 22 Germans he killed as the only way to save the lives o f his men 
(Department o f the Army, 1990, pp. 26-27).
The time component o f  the distance seems to show that the starkness o f 
the moral dilemmas lessens as time goes by, thus taking the edge off o f some of 
the more disturbing memories a combat veteran may have. There is no assurance 
that this buffering effect will actually take place, however, as LT Blake showed in 
a very emotional moment discussing the troops he lost 30 years prior:
LT Blake: 1 see their faces every' fucking day -1 get out o f bed and put my
feet on tlie floor and 1 see their faces and tliey all died in pain. It 
was really - it was very, very bad - they hurt when they died.
.Another important “time" consideration is that the data gathered in this 
research were only meant to be a “snapshot" in time. This study was not 
longitudinal in nature and it may be the case that the answers o f  these veterans 
would have been different ten years before or after these interviews. Having said 
that, however, it also became apparent that most o f  the memories these veterans 
had were deeply ingrained and they had often replayed the events in their own 
minds ( even if  they never discussed them with others) so that the memories 
became a memorized story to some extent that tlie veteran was reciting for this 
researcher.
LT Blake’s experience, however, is similar to that o f .Audie Murphy, the 
most decorated .American hero o f World War 11. who was wounded three times 
and was credited with killing 240 German soldiers. Until his death in 1971. he 
was plagued by nightmares about his combat experiences and slept with a loaded 
pistol under his pillow. W hen asked by an interviewer how combat soldiers
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manage to survive a war, he replied, “ I don’t think they ever do” (Hendin & 
Pollinger-Haas, 1984).
Discussion
Hopefully, the results section has provided the reader with some 
appreciation o f what a leader in combat must face. Bear in mind, however, that 
this information is being collected from an etic sense. .A. common theme that ran 
through many o f  the soldiers’ stories is that they felt inadequately prepared for 
battle and for what they must face when their lives are threatened. Perhaps an 
emic approach is the only platform appropriate for such a study, though placing a 
research psychologist in the position o f an infantry platoon leader would be a sure 
recipe for the military blunder o f our age. The most pressing need for training in 
the military is skill training under conditions that closely approximate combat 
(Janis, 1949). At its best, however, such training can only provide a shadow}' 
view as to what moral dilemmas aw ait the officer in the area of combat.
Currently, the military relies upon the Joint Readiness Training Center at 
Ft. Polk. Louisiana, and the National Training Center at Ft. Irwin. California, to 
prepare soldiers for the rigors o f  battle. Combat conditions are simulated through 
the use o f sophisticated laser gear worn by each soldier and even by some 
vehicles and aircraft. Soldiers “shoot” at the opposing force (OPFOR) troops in a 
complex “ laser tag” battlefield. Emphasis is placed mostly in combat skills in a 
virtual video game, where soldiers are rejuvenated within 24 hours o f  being 
“killed.” With only shadowy notions o f  mortality, little attention is given to 
morality.
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This is not to say, however, that such topics have been abandoned by the 
military. Current doctrine in the U.S. Army’s elite XVIII Airborne Corps, 
headquartered at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, calls for mandatory annual training in 
the rules o f engagement (dubbed “RAMP-ROE" training). Soldiers are also 
expected to cany cards with them delineating the rules o f engagement and 
instructions on how to measure force. The contents o f  the card are listed in 
•\ppendix D. How much o f this training is internalized, however, is not fully 
understood.
Is principled thought possible in the line officer? Most would invariably 
conclude that post-conventional thinking is inconsistent with the demands o f the 
military. Certainly the military will never be the wellspring o f humanity, 
tolerance, and sensitivity. However, some beginnings o f formal operations in 
moral thought were gleaned from some o f the comments. COL Brady stated that 
he refused "to do anything like cut ears o ff or anything cause I didn’t want that 
sort o f  thing done to me.” COL Franks had a black-and-white philosophy that 
guided his thoughts when debating moral issues o f killing or sending men to die. 
COL Franks;
Yeah, the bottom line o f all that, though. 1 think, when you wrestle 
with it a little bit and after you've been with tlie thought a little bit. you 
realize that's why we are all in this uniform - to take the fight to the 
enemy. So, that yoimg Marine that's going forward -  that's going to die - 
that I’ll never see again, signed up for that very thing - to take the fight to 
the enemy. So, it 's  not me and my choice and my decision for personal
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gain to send him forward into the enemy’s guns -  we're both in the 
uniform and, uh, neither o f us would have it any other way.
Perhaps COL Franks’ name will never be listed in the same ranks as post- 
conventional. stage 6 thinkers, but the utilitarian mechanics of COL Franks' 
argument stand to reason as well: for the job that has to be done. COL Franks has 
a solid philosophy in place for dispatching the duties o f  his office. W hen it comes 
to protecting the nation's interests, most would also agree that having M other 
Theresa and Dietrich Bonhoeffer "standing on the wall” would do little to provide 
the deterrent force upon which so much of our nation 's policy relies. While 
principled thought is certainly possible with the line officer (wrestling with moral 
dilemmas almost inevitably results in stage progression), it may not be seen as 
desirable by those giving the orders.
The results support the notion that the officer has a significant impact on 
the moral climate o f  the unit. Moral training for the officers seems to play only a 
bit part in the factors that go into a moral decision, however. Few o f the officers 
were able to recall more than sketchy details o f training in ethics they had 
received as cadets. While honor code violations are a major component o f service 
academy life (".A. cadet will not lie, cheat, or steal nor tolerate those who do”), it 
is unknown how such training translates to the more complex moral nature of 
battle. Would training in morals and ethics impact the officer’s moral decision 
making? Piaget (1964) and Kohlberg (1958) both demonstrated that wrestling 
with cognitive tasks leads to stage progression as long as above-mode reasoning is 
present (Berkowitz & Keller, 1994). Perhaps the current format o f  military moral 
training may change, but its usefulness is certainly established.
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The preceding text, while offering only a glimpse o f the life o f the combat 
leader, shows how thoroughly conversant with moral decision-making the junior 
officer must be. The stakes are not measured in shares o f  stock or economic 
indicators; rather, they are measured in which cots are empty when the patrol 
returns to its base and in the faces o f the men whom the officer must lead his 
eveiy waking hour.
Most o f  the decisions shown here took place in the naturalistic setting. In 
1977, Janis & Mann reported on a vigilant style, where a decision is rendered 
after careful and thorough due process. In the military jargon, however, such a 
decision would not be "field expedient." It is the officer’s duty to render a quick 
and effective decision based on what he knows at that time. Becoming bogged 
down in the process o f getting to that point would mean a loss o f lives, while at 
the same time the officer longs for the luxury' o f having the time to think matters 
through in such meticulous detail. Instead, the officer has to bow to the "go with 
what you know" philosophy.
Another principle predominant in martial service is, "go with what you've 
got." a maxim that often relates to who is serving in a unit. For some elite units, 
such as the Rangers or Special Forces, personnel selection is demanding and 
rigorous, developed through careful testing procedures. For the majority o f  those 
in today’s understaffed military, though (the U.S. Army alone is 20.000 short in 
its recruiting goal), the luxury o f being able to pick and choose exists only in 
one's imagination. Personnel selection, perhaps as proposed by Hogan and 
Lesser (1996), offers little to a personnel-hungry military.
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Is there a “right answer” that provides some assurance as to the outcome 
o f the junior officer’s moral dilemmas? It would seem that the military’s reliance 
lays in the Recognition-Primed Decision model (Klein, 1996) and, through 
continuous drilling in military skills, the leader can be taught to react to a variety 
o f situations. WTtether the automatic, trained response is also moral, however, 
remains open to debate.
There are authors who would classify decisions into such categories as 
premature closure, or rendering a decision before all possible alternatives have 
been considered, nonsvstematic scanning (disorganized consideration o f 
alternatives), or temporal narrowing (allocating insufficient time to considering 
each decision alternative) (Keinan. 1987; Keinan et al., 1987). Given such 
constraints o f time and the critical importance o f action on the officer's part, 
however (every second he delayed, more men would die), it is understandable 
why quick decisions, sometimes perhaps employing simplistic decision rules, are 
made.
It was evident from the interviews that the foremost concern o f these 
leaders lay in their troops. Their goal was centered on accomplishing the 
missions set before them, but caring for their troops remained a central focus, 
both during the mission and after it was over. With so much responsibility 
focused toward the troops in their charge, the officer is often inclined to take 
personal responsibility when one o f  his troops is injured or killed. While rational 
arguments may say that death is a common side effect o f  war. impressing the 
point on an infantry officer is not always so easily effected.
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Another point that dovetails with the notion o f being responsible for one’s 
troops is that o f being responsible for making decisions. This seemed apparent 
through the discussion o f Kohlberg’s dilemma o f the company commander in 
Korea. The combat veteran officers seemed to feel empowered to be the one 
malting the decision and also seemed loathe to yield that power, apparent from 
their disdain o f the idea o f  drawing straws to decide who should stay behind.
The line drawn between the veteran combat officer and the officer who 
has never seen combat was clearly drawn from their responses to the Kohlberg 
dilemma. Why this was the case, however, is unclear. The veterans unanimously 
gave some variation o f the statement. “I’d pick the best man to do the job .” while 
the non-combat officers were unable to reproduce this answer. It is doubtful that 
the veterans’ response was some deeply ingrained “party line.” as the non­
veterans were cadre at an officer training program. Were it the party line, this 
would be where such indoctrination would start. Some similarity o f  combat 
experience seems to be at work and this experience is something that carries 
across time and situations, from World War 11 Germany to southwest .\s ia  in 
1991. This answer may be closely linked with the first pattern (desire for control) 
and may reflect how controlled the officer is in his thought processes. This may 
be a product o f  some degree o f training the officer has received or some level of 
discipline the militaiy' system has imposed. How one might establish that control, 
however, is a matter for future research.
The appropriateness o f categorizing data into three patterns is a matter of 
debate. The three patterns seemed sufficient to cover and organize the data. It 
was noted previously that patterns ranged anywhere from one to approximately
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150, but three does still seem to have illuminated what it is like for an officer to 
weigh moral dilemmas while leading troops into combat. Note the concluding 
remarks o f Bradley W atson (1999), who stated, “The military ultimately draws 
from, and is a reflection of. the society o f  which it is a part (p. 68)." A s  the 
soldiers in today’s military are drawn from the larger society, it may not always 
be possible for one to separate the actions o f the military from the general 
consensus o f the nation. Consider the historical context o f  the cavalry outposts in 
the early .American West after the W ar o f  1812. The feeling o f Manifest Destiny 
encouraged .Americans to seek new land in the west, often at the expense o f 
Native American claims to those territories. The cavalry outposts were design to 
protect the settlers from Indian raids and further encourage westward expansion. 
This policy has since been criticized as being rather strong-armed and unfair to 
the indigenous population. Many decades later, the U.S. policy in Vietnam drew 
similar criticism.
One possible conclusion o f this research is that the combat officer must 
have highly efficient decision-making skills if he is to perform his duties. 
“Thinking too much” may well work against the officer’s effectiveness in an 
emergency. The system seems to reward the officer who has a well-rehearsed 
praxis in mind for how he must react to conditions on the battlefield. This 
system, however, is sometimes lacking in helping the officer to cope with his 
decisions in retrospect, when he does have the time to fire his decisions in the 
crucible for their moral rightness.
The officers varied widely in the context o f R est’s 1979 components o f a 
moral decision. Some seemed to have an acute sense o f  when a situation was
85
morally offensive (such as the officer observing a soldier knocking the teeth out 
o f  the enemy dead) and took action against it. Others seemed to have never 
reached the crucial first stage to recognize that a moral dilemma was presenting 
itself. Where these soldiers were in terms of Kohlberg's stages o f moral 
development (1958), however, is open to discussion. Perhaps future research will 
examine this to show where the mode lies and where moral reasoning is most 
effective in a strict utilitarian sense.
There is an extensive body o f literature (Driskell & Salas. 1991 ; Keinan, 
1987; Klein, 1996; Orasanu & Connolly 1993) that focuses on making decisions 
in emergency situations and under stress. None o f these studies, however, use 
combat leaders as participants nor do they focus on the unique problems the 
combat leader must face. While the deliberation to take one life is the subject of 
scrutiny (Haney. Sontag. & Costanzo. 1994), the decision to send subordinates to 
their deaths or direct the killing o f  others while in lethal conditions seems to be an 
area under-served by psychological research. What are the factors that are most 
crucial to the combat leader rendering such decisions? Is there a decision-making 
model that most effectively assimilates one's knowledge about the situation and 
assists the officer in arriving at a course o f action? When decisions are made to 
take a life (or to cause someone to give up their life), what coping strategies are 
used with best effect when the officer analyzes his actions and decisions later? 
Perhaps subsequent research will seek to further illuminate our understanding o f 
this area and assist in gaining clarification on the moral and decision-making 
schemata o f the combat officer.
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To further emphasize the point, it was this author's disappointing 
discovery during the search o f  the literature that very little attention is given to the 
infantry officer in the psychological research, particularly as pertains to moral 
reasoning and decision-making style. The reasons for this are not well 
understood, but it seems that the militaiy focus in psychological research swings 
to those je t fighter pilots and submarine commanders who, though their work is 
no less important in a martial sense, experience less o f the psycho-moral morass 
that so often plagues the memories of the infantry officer. Even in the extremely 
limited population of combat veterans presented in this study it is evident that the 
lives lost under the direction o f  any one o f the officers - both enemy and friendly 
dead -  extracted a heavier toll in terms o f human life than the majority o f civil 
aviation mishaps. Furthermore, the issues with which they must wrestle are on a 
scale far grander and in excess o f the dilemmas that a fighter pilot or submarine 
commander could even postulate.
Having identified an area o f  research that has little supply from which to 
draw, yet great demand for the fruits o f psychology's labor, it is the ardent hope 
o f this writer that more will be done in this area in the years ahead. A  downsizing 
military that has experienced a continual increase in missions over the past ten 
years has become increasingly familiar with high operational tempo running 
hand-in-hand with near-phrenetic levels o f stress. Peacekeeping missions pose 
new moral challenges for today 's officer. Will the field o f psychology provide 
new answers?
In the First World W ar, psychologists asked, “What can we do to help the 
war effort?” and the practice o f  assessment and selection was bom. With similar
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sentiments, the question is again to be asked by this field today. Perhaps our 
infantry leaders will stand in better stead to recognize and manipulate moral 
decisions under battlefield conditions. Perhaps those same leaders will be more 
advantageously poised to live with the consequences o f their decisions once the 
battlefield is but a memor)'.
By way o f  sum m an', it is this author’s conviction that tlie majority o f  the 
moral regret in this world stems not from actions one has taken, but from actions 
not taken.
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Appendix A
Interview Questions
Who were the most significant moral influences in your life? Your moral role 
models? Were your morals shaped through church, school, your 
family...some other moral influence?
How was your conduct at home and at school?
How long have you been (were you) in the .Army?
(If drafted) - How did you find out you were drafted?
(If not) - Why did you decide to go into the service?
What was your feeling toward the Army prior to your enlistment?
What training did you receive in morals prior to Vietnam/Korea/W W II/Gulf War 
(family, church, school, officer training)?
When did you find out you were going to Korea? W4iat were your reactions?
Before you got into combat, what did you think it was going to be like? What did 
you think it would be like to be in combat?
What kind o f  unit were you in?
What was your view of the moral nature of Korea? View o f the Koreans?
What was your experience o f  combat? (Where you saw action, what years, your
position)
What moral situations did you encounter? Decisions made? How do you feel 
now about the decisions you made?
What could you have done differently to feel better about what you did do?
What were some o f  the toughest things you did?
What are your most vivid memories?
Is there a time when you felt particularly good about a moral decision you made? 
Is there a time when you felt particularly bad?
Was there a time you remember being the most frightened?
Was there a situation that you found yourself most afraid o f 
doing wrong? W hat does “wrong” mean?
If you had to decide again on the moral situations you faced, would you change 
your decisions?
If you were going to prepare someone (a junior officer or cadet) to do what you 
had to do, what preparation would you want them to have? W4tat would 
you want them to know?
Did (or How did) combat change your moral structiu’e?
One veteran commented that he felt he didn’t have to make moral choices, that
the repetition in training was what did a lot o f his deciding for him. Could 
you comment on that?
.Another veteran commented that you go to war because o f  a flag, but you fight 
because o f vour buddies. Could vou comment on that?
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Kohlberg’S components o f  moral reasoning include the following:
1 - reward and punishment - It’s wrong because I’ll get punished if  1 do it
2 - “scratch your back” - W hat can you do for me? What do 1 need to do for you?
3 - social pressure - What do most other people do in this instance?
4 - law and order - What rules are in place to govern this situation?
5 - societal good - 1 did it for the common good
6 - principled thought - An overriding maxim is used in moral interpretations.
like, “ Do unto others as you would have others do unto you.”
Do you feel you can fit your behavior into any of the above categories? How so?
R est's components o f rendering a moral decision are: 1 ) realization o f a moral 
dilemma, 2) formulation o f moral choices. 3) deciding on a moral plan, 
and. 4) executing that plan. Can you comment on whether this bears 
relevance to the decisions you made? Do you find your thinking fell into 
any o f these components?
If you were conducting this research, what questions would you ask to tap into the 
moral reasoning o f  combat officers?
Is there anslhing else you would like to add?
Do you know o f anyone else with your experiences who might also be willing to 
be interviewed?
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Appendix B 
Kohlberg’s Dilemma
In Korea, a company of Marines was greatly outnumbered and was 
retreating before the enemy. The company had crossed a bridge over a river, but 
the enemy were still mostly on the other side. If someone went back to the bridge 
and blew it up as the enemy soldiers were coming over it, it would weaken the 
enemy. With the head start the rest o f  the men in the company would have, they 
could probably then escape. But the man who stayed back to blow up the bridge 
would probably not be able to escape alive; there would be about a 4 to 1 chance 
that he would be killed. The captain o f  the company has to decide who should go 
back and do the job. The captain him self is the man who knows best how to lead 
the retreat. He asks for volunteers, but no one will volunteer. Should the captain 
order a man to stay behind, or stay behind himself, or leave nobody behind?
Why?
The continuation o f the dilemm a follows:
The captain finally decided to order one o f the men to stay behind. One of 
the men he thought o f  had a lot o f strength and courage but he was a bad 
troublemaker. He was always stealing things from the other men, beating them 
up, and refusing to do his work. The second man he thought o f had gotten a bad 
disease in Korea and was likely to die in a short time anyway, though he was 
strong enough to do the job. If the captain was going to send one o f the two men. 
should he send the troublemaker or the sick man? Whv?
(Duska & Whelan. 1975, p. 122)
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Appendix C 
Military Titles
DAP AM 27-1 Treaties Governing Land Warfare
FM 22-51 Leaders' M anual for Combat Stress Control
PM 22-100 Military Leadership
FM 22-102 Soldier Team Development
FM 25-100 Training the Force
FM 25-101 Training the Force: Battle-focused Training
FM 27-1 Legal Guide for Commanders
FM 27-10 The Law o f  Land Warfare
FM 100-1 The Army
FM 101-5 Staff Organization and Operations
MQS I (Training Support Package) Leadership 
MQS 1 (Training Support Package) Leadership (Ethics)
MQS I (Training Support Package) Principles o f War
MQS 1 (Training Support Package) Law o f War
MQS 1 (Training Support Package) The Military' Justice System
MQS I (Training Support Package) Military Law and Justice
MQS 1 (Training Support Package) Code of Conduct
Cadet Troop Leader Training: The Host Commander's Guide
Oklahoma ARNG recruiting packet
Readings for the Professional Leader o f the Company
Career Development Orientation Packet: Oklahoma ARNG OCS
SH 7-161 Customs and Courtesies o f  the Service 
SH 7-189-1 Leaders' Reaction Course 
SH 22-227 OCS Leadership Workbook
TC 22-9-3 Military Professionalism (Battalion Instruction)
TC 27-10-1 Selected Problems in the Law o f War 
TC 27-10-2 Prisoners o f  War
(1975). The Armed Forces Officer. Washington: Armed Forces 
Information Ser\'ice, U nited States Govemment Printing Office.
Wakin, Malham (1981). War. Morality, and the Military Profession. 
Boulder: Westview Press.
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Appendix D 
RAMP-RQE Card Contents
(Front)
RAMP - Applied Meaning 
R - Return Fire - means that i f  you have been fired on or otherwise attacked you 
may do what you must to protect yourself. This is the core o f the right to self 
defense, which is never denied.
A - Anticipate Attack - means that self defense is not limited to returned fire. 
Soldiers do not have to receive the first shot before using force to protect 
themselves and other lives.
M - Measure Force - means that if you have a moment to choose your method, 
you must do so.
P - Protect Only Life with Deadly Force - or property designated by the 
commander, i.e., sensitive items, etc. Means shoot to kill.
(Back)
Measure Your Force 
V - Verbal Warning - Tell person(s), in their language, to disperse, stay away, or 
halt.
E - Exhibit W eapon - Show your weapon or use some other display that you have 
superior force at your disposal.
W - Warning Shot - Shoot a warning shot, if authorized.
P - Pepper Spray - Spray cayenne pepper spray, if authorized.
R - Riot Stick - Strike with riot stick, if authorized and available and if  the 
individual is close enough. Poke fleshy parts of the body first, arms and legs next, 
and, if  necessary, escalate to striking the head.
1 - Injure With Fire - Shoot to wound.
K - Kill - Shoot to kill.
(XVIII Airborne Corps, 1996)
